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ABSTRACT 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund) has been acting as an international lender 
of last resort, mainly supporting emerging and developing countries the last decades. After 
various crises hit the world economy in the second half of the 1990s, intensive criticism 
against the IMF has emerged, related to the macroeconomic effects of their lending 
arrangements. This thesis contributes to the debate on how the IMF’s lending arrangements 
affect their member countries in terms of macroeconomic outcomes, with emphasize on 
balance of payments, economic growth, and inflation. I will present a literature review, and 
base the conclusions of the study on secondary research available in literature. It seems to be a 
general consensus among researchers that the IMF, through their lending arrangements, do 
cause a positive effect on balance of payments and that their intervention tend to cause 
negative effects on countries’ economic growth, while there is no evidence found of any 
effects on inflation. The issue of the existence of moral hazard caused by the IMF is also 
closely investigated, whereof no conclusions can be drawn due to the lack of reliable methods 
to measure the concept. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
"The International Monetary Fund (IMF [or the Fund]) is an organization of 188 countries, 
working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate 
international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce 
poverty around the world" (IMF, 2013a). 
IMF programs are much more common than people might think, and participation rates are 
steadily increasing. Based on numbers up until the year 2000, Vreeland states in his book that 
"during any given year, about one quarter of the world was under an IMF program at some 
point” (2007, p. 75). IMF’s arrangements (or programs) are designed to reach specific and 
multiple goals. To fairly discuss and evaluate the Fund’s interference in the world economy 
and outcomes of their work, it is important to first address IMF’s intentions, and then later 
debate on how their work have affected, and may affect the countries participating in one or 
more IMF programs/arrangements in the future. Various studies have shown different results 
on how IMF arrangements affect different indicators such as; balance of payments, inflation, 
economic growth, income distribution, poverty, the environment, foreign direct investments 
(FDI) and social spending. Some have focused their research to only one of the mentioned 
indicators, other have extended their studies into deeper macroeconomic analysis. 
A difficult task is to identify what outcomes are due to the circumstances of the recipient 
countries (country-specific factors such as; economic factors, type of government, political 
motivation etc., and general world economic conditions such as; level of international trade, 
international lending rates etc.), and what outcomes are due to the IMF’s participation. The 
Fund has been under a lot criticism, and the intensity of this criticism increased in the second 
half of the 1990s after a various crisis hit different parts of the world economy (Özgür, 2009). 
It is mainly the conditions the IMF attaches to its loans that attract most of the criticism. 
Moral hazard has also been a term widely discussed by critics, where "moral hazard is a 
forward-looking concept: where moral hazard exists in financial markets, borrowers and 
lenders take risks now based on the support they anticipate receiving in the future if certain 
undesirable events occur" (T. Lane & Phillips, 2002).  
True field experimentation with a “treatment” and “control” group would obviously in these 
studies be considered both controversial and unethical. One of the studied groups would here 
suffer in one way or another, leading millions of people to experience negative outcomes from 
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an economic recession or crisis. Theories, educated guesses, outcome evidence and 
estimations are what researchers have to rely on for statistical methods in order to get any 
verifying results. 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the intentions of the International Monetary Fund, 
and the impact and macroeconomic effects participating countries experience through their 
lending arrangements. I will limit the research to the most discussed terms in literature, which 
includes the effects on balance of payments, economic growth and inflation. The question if 
IMF lending arrangements create moral hazard will also be investigated. The research will 
strive to create a picture of the typical outcomes of IMF arrangements and not create country 
specific overviews. I will be presenting a literature review based on secondary data available, 
where the most prevailing theories and key researchers are highlighted. In this thesis, the 
ambition is to answer the following research questions: 
 What are the IMF's intentions with their lending arrangements? 
 What are the outcomes of the IMF's lending arrangements for the recipient countries 
in terms of balance of payments problems, economic growth and inflation? 
 Do the IMF lending arrangements contribute to moral hazard, and to what extend? 
 
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows; chapter two will provide the reader with 
information about the International Monetary Fund and their lending arrangements. Chapter 
three will give information about the methodology approach used for this thesis, and the 
approaches widely used in earlier research on the field of inquiry, while chapter four will 
provide the necessary theories for analyzing the effects and outcomes of IMF lending 
arrangements. Chapter five and six will present information about IMF intervention and the 
results of effects on the Funds’ lending arrangements, while chapter seven will provide the 
conclusions of the study. 
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2. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
2.1 History of the IMF 
The IMF was founded in New Hampshire, USA in 1944 after the Second World War at the 
Bretton Woods Conference, where the founders agreed on a framework for international 
economic cooperation. In the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s, countries had 
been trying to raise barriers for foreign trade in order to shore up their economies. This led the 
founders of IMF to form an international monetary system in attempt to ensure exchange rate 
stability and encourage its member countries to continue their trade without exchange rate 
restrictions. The IMF closely monitored all currencies of its members, and lent to countries if 
their value of currency dropped in order help shore up their economies. Also devaluation of 
currencies had to be approved by the Fund. This monitoring of exchange rates, primarily 
between the industrialized countries of Western Europe and the US, has little to do with the 
Fund's economic programs as they have been during the recent decades, where the focus area 
have mainly been the developing world. 
In December 1945 the first 29 member countries ratified the Fund's Articles of Agreement, 
and the IMF officially started their work.
1
 The countries that joined up until 1971 agreed to 
keep their exchange rates pegged in order to IMF’s agreement,2 but after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system - between 1968 to 1973, the IMF lost its major function as the 
guarantor of fixed exchange rates among developed countries. Consequently, the IMF’s role 
now expanded into many new areas. Many researchers say that it is around this time the IMF 
shifted their focus from the industrialized world towards the developing world. During the last 
three decades, the Fund’s activities have been mainly concentrated on underdeveloped and 
developing countries. However, after the hit of the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, the 
Great Recession, the IMF has recently been resurrected in the industrialized world (Fischer, 
1997; IMF, 2013b; Vreeland, 2007; Özgür, 2009).  
The Fund has today 188 membership countries, which makes it a near-global financial 
institution, including all regions of the world and embracing all from poor to rich countries. It 
is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has offices around the world in order to reflect its 
global reach and close ties with its members. Its role is to help member governments with 
                                                 
1
 The original members of the IMF is enclosed in the appendix – table A1 
2
 “The value of their currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar and, in the case of the United States, the value of the 
dollar in terms of gold” (IMF, 2013b) 
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policy advice and financing, helping them to take advantage of opportunities, and to manage 
challenges caused by globalization and economic development. It is a goal for the IMF to help 
member governments achieve macroeconomic stability and to reduce poverty on a global 
scale. The IMF states that their fundamental mission today is to help ensure stability in the 
international system. This is done in three ways; “keeping track of the global economy and 
the economies of member countries; lending to countries with balance of payments 
difficulties; and giving practical help to members” (IMF, 2013d). The IMF’s article of 
agreement below states the purposes of the Fund. 
 
Table 2.1: IMF’s Article of Agreement I – Purposes 
Source: (IMF, 2013a) 
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are: 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution 
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international 
monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources 
of all members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of 
current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth in this 
Article. 
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2.2 The IMF and World Bank 
The IMF and World Bank share the same goal of raising living standards in their member 
countries and collaborate in several joint initiatives in issues that are relevant for both, and in 
areas where their responsibilities overlap each other. Since March 29, 2006, they have had a 
working External Review Committee working to examine the areas where the collaboration 
can propose improvements. “Under the Joint Management Action Plan on World Bank–IMF 
Collaboration, IMF and World Bank country teams discuss their country-level work 
programs, which identify macro-critical sectoral issues, the division of labor, and the work 
needed from each institution” (IMF, 2013e, 2013g). 
 
2.3 IMF Membership 
To become a member of the IMF, a country has to apply and be accepted by the majority of 
the Fund’s existing members. The financial and organizational relationship between the 
member countries and the IMF is mainly determined by the countries’ quotas. The quotas 
assigned to each country are broadly based on the relative size of the country in the world 
economy. The countries joining must pay a subscription based on its assigned quotas, and up 
to 25 percent of this must be paid in IMF’s own currency, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)3. 
US dollars, euros, Japanese yen and pounds sterling are widely accepted currencies, and can 
at any time replace SDRs. The remaining subscription is paid in the country’s own currencies. 
The quotas have an impact on the member countries’ voting power in the Fund, its access to 
financing and its share in SDR allocations. The quota is held as an interest bearing deposit at 
the Fund, and it is not a sum paid each year. A varies of decisions based on votes, called from 
the Articles of Agreement, calls most often on a simple majority from the member countries, 
sometimes by 85 percent super-majorities. The largest quota belongs to the United States, and 
it controls currently 16.75 percent of the Fund's votes. This large percentage of votes is 
enough to give USA veto power in decisions that require 85 percent majority of the votes. 
Japan, Germany, the UK, France, together with the US counts for the five countries with the 
largest amount of quotas in the Fund. Every five years, the Board of Governors (or the Board) 
normally review the size of quotas assigned to each member country to ensure that the size of 
                                                 
3
 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) was created as a new reserve asset by the IMF, and was approved in 1986 by 
the IMF members. SDRs can only be held by governments, not private by holders. The asset (currency) is 
interest bearing and can at any time be converted into hard currency (dollars, euros, yen or pound sterling) 
(Joyce, 2013). “On April 30, 2013, the SDR/U.S. dollar exchange rate was US$1 = SDR 0.662691, and the U.S. 
dollar/SDR exchange rate was SDR 1 = US$1.509” (IMF, 2013g, p. 3) 
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the quotas correctly reflects the countries’ relative size in the world economy (IMF, 2013c, 
2013h; Vreeland, 2007). 
 
2.4 IMF Lending 
Any member country can borrow from the IMF; it doesn't matter if it's rich, middle-income or 
poor. If it cannot find sufficient financing to make its international payments on affordable 
terms in the capital market, a country can sign to the IMF for financial support or assistance. 
The Fund works as an international lender of last resort - a term closer discussed later in this 
thesis. 
"The IMF is not a development bank and, unlike the World Bank and other development 
agencies, it does not finance projects" (IMF, 2013d). The main goals for the IMF loans are to 
help stabilize economies, restore sustainable economic growth and help to deal with balance 
of payments problems. The IMF and the retrieving country have to agree on the participation 
of the Fund program and on a suitable program of policies in order to achieve the specific and 
quantified goals. A country agrees to adjust its economic policies in order to overcome its 
economic problems. The Fund require these loan conditions ("conditionality") to ensure that 
the retrieving country will be able to repay its loans without having to face harmful measures 
to national or international prosperity. The conditions for each program are described in a 
letter of intent (LOI), which the recipient country is responsible to select, design and 
implement. The content and objectives of this letter of intent will broadly depend on the 
country’s circumstances, with always having IMF’s guidelines and missions in focus. The 
content and structure of the letters of intent vary from country to country, but the most 
common recommendations from the IMF include privatization, capital market liberalization 
and deregulation of the private sector. The LOI is usually signed by the president of the 
member country's central bank, or the president or prime minister of the country. If the 
requesting country has provided the 25 percent quota in “hard” currency or SDRs, it may 
request loans up until this amount without any conditions attached (IMF, 2013a; Vreeland, 
2007). 
 
2.4.1 IMF Lending Arrangements 
The IMF provides various types of loans to its member countries, and it classifies and tailors 
its loans according to the reason the money is needed and the circumstances of the country 
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membership. Polar (1991) in (Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000) states that the differences 
between the Fund’s offered programs relate to conditions, timing, and size of the loan 
disbursements, while the fundamental objectives of the programs are the same. IMF lending is 
intended to be temporary with a repayment period of one to five years. The main loan 
instruments are called Stand-By Arrangements, Precautionary and Liquidity Line, Flexible 
Credit Line, Extended Fund Facility and Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. These are the 
main loans provides as of today, some of them have been added in later years, and some of 
them have changed during the life period of the Fund. This part of the thesis will give a brief 
introduction to the main lending arrangements, and table 2.2 on the next page gives a 
summary of the different types of arrangements, scheduled time period, maximum lending 
amounts and the policy conditions attached to each program. 
 
Stand-By Arrangement 
IMF calls its Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) its workhorse lending instrument for emerging 
market countries. This program is used time and again, mostly by middle income and 
advanced member countries, and is created to help countries overcome their short-term 
balance of payments problems. It provides interest rates that are non-concessional, but that 
usually are lower than the ones offered from private markets.
4
 The duration of the SBA 
program is flexible, where one to two years is the typical program period, with no more than 
36 months. Repayment under the SBA is due within 3¼ to 5 years of disbursement (IMF, 
2013f). 
 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line 
"The Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) provides financing to meet actual or potential 
balance of payments needs of countries with sound policies [and that are committed to 
maintain sound policies in the future], and is intended to serve as insurance and help resolve 
crises” (IMF, 2013f). The duration of the PLL can either be of six months, or one to two 
years, where renewal of the PLL program is normally possible after a two-year cool-off 
period. The PLL follows the same qualification process as the FCL, and carries the same 
interest rates as the SBA (IMF, 2013f). 
                                                 
4
 “The lending rate is tied to the IMF’s market-related interest rate, known as the basic rate of charge, which is 
itself linked to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) interest rate” (IMF, 2013f). 
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Table 2.2: Main IMF Lending Arrangements  
Source: (IMF, 2013f; 2013g, pp. 37-38) 
Type of 
Arrangement 
Time Period 
-Scheduled 
Years- 
Maximum Lending 
Amount 
(percentage of 
member’s quotas) 
Conditions 
Stand-by 
arrangements 
(SBA) 
Medium-term 
3¼ to 5 years 
Annual: 200% ; 
cumulative: 600%  
“Adopt policies that provide 
confidence that the member’s 
balance of payments 
difficulties 
will be resolved within a 
reasonable period” 
Precautionary and 
liquidity line 
(PLL) 
Medium-term 
3¼ to 5 years 
Up to 250 percent for 6 
months, maximum 
1000 percent for the 
entire lending time 
“Strong policy frameworks, 
external position, and market 
access, including financial 
sector soundness” 
Flexible credit line 
(FCL) 
Medium-term 
3¼ to 5 years 
No preset limit “Very strong ex ante 
macroeconomic fundamentals, 
economic policy framework, 
and policy track record” 
Extended fund 
facility (EFF) 
Longer-term 
4½–10 years 
250% for 6 months; 
500% available upon 
approval of 1- to 2-year 
arrangements; total of 
1,000% 12 months of 
satisfactory progress 
“Adopt up to 4-year program, 
with structural agenda, with 
annual detailed statement of 
policies for the next 12 
months” 
Poverty reduction 
and growth trust 
(PRGT) 
Medium- to 
longer-term 
4-10 years 
Annual: from 25% to 
100%; cumulative: 
from 100% to 300%. 
Adopt to 3-4 years / 12-14 
month programs according to 
the specific PRGT arrangement 
 
 
Flexible Credit Line 
The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) is IMF’s lending instrument for countries with very strong 
economic fundamentals and policy track records. Countries that are under this lending 
program can draw from a pre-specified window of credit line at any time, while the cost of 
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borrowing under the FCL is the same as under SBA and PLL. “The FCL works as a 
renewable credit line, which at the country’s discretion could initially be for either one- or 
two-years with a review of eligibility after the first year” (IMF, 2013f). Repayment should 
take place over a period of 3¼ to 5 years. 
 
Extended Fund Facility 
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is created to help countries address medium- and longer-
term balance of payments problems. The EFF has a longer duration period and repayment 
period than the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). Normally, the duration period of the program 
doesn’t exceed three years, with a maximum time limit of four years. “Repayment is due 
within 4½–10 years from the date of disbursement” (IMF, 2013f). 
 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
In order to help low-income countries, the IMF provides more flexible lending facilities to 
meet increased demand for financial assistance for countries in need. The Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Trust (PRGT) includes; Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Standby Credit 
Facility (SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF)”, which are programs that provide 
financial assistance to low-income countries with protracted, urgent, and short-term balance 
of payment problems. These loans have different maturity, lasting from 12 months up to 10 
years, and carry no interest rates. “In addition to concessional loans, some low-income 
countries are also eligible for debts to be written off under two key initiatives” (IMF, 2013d); 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) (IMF, 2013d; Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000). 
 
To give an idea of how large these main lending arrangements are relative to each other, table 
2.3 on the next page presents the percentage of the total IMF ongoing lending arrangements of 
2013 divided into the number of arrangements approved and amounts committed. As shown, 
the PRGT accounts for the largest number of arrangements, but the lowest amount committed. 
The arrangement accounting for the largest amount committed by the IMF in 2013 was the 
FCL – which accounted for 47.9 percent of the total IMF lending. 
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Table 2.3: Percentage of Total IMF Ongoing Lending Arrangements and amounts 
committed for the fiscal year of 2013. Source: (IMF, 2013g) 
Type of Arrangement Percentage of Total IMF Lending 
(data of 2013) 
 Number of 
arrangements 
Amounts 
committed 
Stand-by arrangements (SBA) 17.07 % 3.36 % 
Precautionary and liquidity line (PLL) 2.44 % 2.69 % 
Flexible credit line (FCL) 7.32 % 47.90 % 
Extended fund facility (EFF) 12.20% 44.00 % 
Poverty reduction and growth trust (PRGT) 60.90 % 1.90 % 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
Several methods are used in order to study IMF program macroeconomic effects. What we 
would like to figure out is what would have happened if countries had not participated in an 
IMF program, and on the other hand; countries that didn’t participate, what would have 
happened if they actually had participated. These types of scenarios can naturally not be 
measured or observed, but a lot of estimation has been made in order to try to come as close 
to a verified answer as possible. 
3.1 Literature Review 
This thesis will be a literature review based on secondary data available. I will give an 
overview of the field of inquiry, and base my research on literature that has already been 
written in order to investigate my research questions: 
 What are the IMF's intentions with their lending arrangements? 
 What are the outcomes of the IMF's lending arrangements for the recipient countries 
in terms of balance of payments problems, economic growth and inflation? 
 Do the IMF lending arrangements contribute to moral hazard, and to what extend? 
 
I will highlight the key writers, the prevailing theories and hypotheses, and emphasize the 
methods used in available studies and previous research on the subject. The methods 
mentioned are highly qualitative, as the aim is to create a picture of the IMF's lending 
arrangements in respective countries. The research will be limited to create a picture of the 
typical outcomes of IMF arrangements and will not create country specific overviews. 
Available information and studies will be used to create an overall picture of the intentions of 
the IMF and the typical outcomes of their work (University of Canberra, 2013). 
 
3.2 Previous Research 
This section aims to give a brief summary of the alternative methods previously used to study 
the macroeconomic effects of IMF arrangements. Examples of different research methods 
used are “the before-after approach, the with-without approach, an approach to control for 
selection on observed variables, an approach to control for selection on unobserved factors, 
and an alternative method to control for non-random selection, called an instrumental variable 
approach” (Vreeland, 2007, p. 76). Haque and Khan (1998) mention a generalized evaluation 
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approach and a comparison of simulation approach to list the main methods used. Dreher 
(2006) mentions in addition regression analysis as one way of analyzing the effect on 
economic growth.  
 
The Before-After Approach 
The before-after approach compares the economic conditions for countries before and after an 
IMF arrangement. Killick, Malik, and Manuel (1990) claim that this method is the most 
commonly and easiest method to use. The results show whether the arrangements were 
associated with an improvement on the initial situation. Among critics of this method is 
Haque and Khan (1998), Bird (2001) and Vreeland (2007) who state the results of this method 
can give misleading results, because it is a big assumption to make that everything, 
considering all economic and social conditions, stays the same after program participation as 
it did before. This method misses the counterfactual test, as it assumes that policies and the 
external environment remain constant after an IMF intervention. 
 
The With-Without Approach 
The with-without approach compare the outcomes of IMF arrangements of participating 
countries with non-participation countries. This method includes the counterfactual aspect by 
using a control group, but the difficulties lies in finding a complete match in order to get 
verifying research results (Killick et al., 1990). As Vreeland (2007) states; a country is much 
more likely to participate in an IMF program when they meet economic difficulties or crises 
than countries that don’t face these problems, which is a somewhat unfair comparison. Garuda 
(2000) has an approach to this method by using a statistical technique known as “propensity 
score estimation”, where the treatment and control groups used are countries that have 
approximately the same probability to agree to an IMF arrangement - this in terms of the 
countries pre-program economic/financial problems. 
 
Selection on Observed or Unobserved Factors 
The next two methods follow the with-without approach, and control the perceived outcomes 
of IMF programs for selection on observed or unobserved factors. By including unobserved 
factors in their studies, researchers may have to consider that their results include error terms 
that cannot be correlated. Unobserved factor may be the difference in the design of the actual 
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IMF programs, the political willingness of the governments, and the likelihood of actually 
getting approval for IMF arrangements. A similar approach is called the generalized 
evaluation estimator (GEE) approach, and is mentioned by, among others, Haque and Khan 
(1998). The GEE is a with-without approach that “accepts the non-random selection of 
program countries, identifies the specific differences between program and non-program 
countries in the pre-program period, and then controls for these differences in initial positions 
in the comparison of subsequent economic performance” (Haque & Khan, 1998, p. 10). 
 
Comparison of Simulations 
This methodology approach determines the effects of IMF arrangements by comparing 
simulations of country performance under IMF arrangements with simulations of 
macroeconomic models and policy packages instead of actual macroeconomic outcomes. 
Haque and Khan (1998) describe this approach as useful when evaluating the design and 
effectiveness of IMF-supported arrangements in general – by estimating the effects of IMF 
arrangements. They further mention several advantages using this approach, among others 
that one does not have to be concerned about countries’ compliance with the IMF’s policy 
conditions in order to study the effects. The lack of available and comprehensive econometric 
models for comparisons creates limitations for this approach in order to capture the real 
effects for the studies (Haque & Khan, 1998). 
 
The Instrumental Variables Approach 
When using an instrumental variables approach to control for non-random selection, 
researchers try to find some factors that drive selection into IMF programs – factors that do 
not affect the outcome one is trying to evaluate. One critique against the IMF is for example 
that some countries may have a greater chance to get IMF loans or to get softer conditions, 
most often due to some prior connection with the IMF - political or otherwise. The before-
after approach and the with-without approach are so-called simple research methods that do 
not control for the selection problem. The instrumental variables approach can help with the 
selection problem in these cases, but are not easy to come by as the variables that drive 
selection into IMF arrangements also influence the effects of the actual IMF arrangements 
(Vreeland, 2007). 
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The Extent of Program Completion 
This approach compares the compliance of countries and governments with the IMF 
arrangements in terms of loans completion and policy conditions. When studying the extent of 
program completion, researches try to find out the reasons for program shortfalls. Also 
discontinuance of IMF arrangements before the intended time period is used as an indicator of 
program performance (Killick et al., 1990). 
 
It is clear that there are a variety of different approaches for studying the outcomes of IMF 
arrangements, and many researchers have tried to combine different methods in order to 
verify their results and outcomes. As mentioned before, real field experiments in order to 
study the effects of IMF arrangement are considered quite unethical and are impossible to 
follow through. Some approaches are more informative than others and give more reliable 
information. Killick et al. (1990) has made an attempt to summarize the uses and limitations 
of each method – which is presented in table 3.1 on the next page. The authors have in this 
summary added target-actual test which compares the outcomes of IMF arrangements with 
the targets written into the Fund’s conditions in order to check for the intended results from 
the Fund – in addition to country or program case studies. These two approaches will not be 
emphasized further. 
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Table 3.1: Uses and Limitations of Alternative Tests of IMF Programs  
Source:(Killick et al., 1990, p. 9 Table 1) 
 
 
  
   Research methods  
 Before-
after 
Target-
actual 
With-
without 
Comparison 
of 
simulations 
Generalized 
evaluation 
Completed-
uncompleted 
Case-
study 
Program results: 
1. Does the program 
improve on the initial 
situation 
 
2. Do program countries 
do better than non-
programs? 
 
3. Do programs improve 
upon likely 
alternative outcomes? 
 
4. Are program effect 
sustained? 
 
5. At what costs are 
their results secured? 
 
6. Can the results be 
generalized? 
 
7. Do results differ for 
(a) Country types? 
(b) Program types? 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W 
 
 
 
 
 
W 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
W 
 
Result determinants: 
8. Influence of 
exogenous factors 
 
9. Program 
implementations 
 
10. Impact on instrument 
variables 
 
11. Impact on financial 
flows 
 
 
 
W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
  
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Key: Y = The test provides useful information bearing on the issue in the left-hand column 
W = The test is particularly in this area 
D = Debatable. There is disagreement in the literature on whether this test can provide 
useful information of the type asked for 
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4. THEORY 
The aim of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to the most used terms and relationships 
for analyzing the effects and outcomes of IMF lending arrangements. Also a brief 
introduction to financial crisis theory is presented, in addition to giving some insights to other 
theories related to better understand the discussions of this thesis. 
4.1 Terms 
There are some terms that are widely used in researcher's discussions on the IMF's 
arrangements. These include GDP, inflation, economic growth, balance of payments, and 
income distribution. 
 
4.1.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
The gross domestic product (GDP or Y) is the most used indicator of economic development 
and can be described as the value of all goods and services produced in a country or an 
economy in one year, and reflect the average income of a country’s citizens. GDP can be 
measured by summing up a country’s yearly output/expenditures -in forms of consumption, 
investment, government expenditures/purchases, and net exports-, or the country’s total 
national income -in forms of wages, interest, profits, and rents earned- divided by the 
population (Soubbotina, 2004; Steigum, 2004; Weil & Sharma, 2013). 
The GDP consists of private consumption (C), government spending (G), investments (I) and 
export surplus – export (EX) minus import (IM). 
Y = C + G + I + (EX – IM) 
 
GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita is also called income per capita, and is the nation’s GDP divided by its 
population. When comparing and converting the GDP among different countries and for 
different time periods, we have to use exchange rates based on the purchasing power parity 
(PPP). “By using the PPP conversion factor instead of the currency exchange rate, we can 
convert a country's GNP per capita calculated in national currency units into GNP per capita 
in U.S. dollars while taking into account the difference in domestic prices for the same goods” 
(Soubbotina, 2004, p. 142). 
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4.1.2 Inflation 
Inflation describes the rise in the general price levels of commodity and services quoted in 
units of money over a certain period of time. The inflation rate represents the annualized 
percentage growth of several indexes, where the main index is the consumer price index – 
which is an index that considers the most common goods and services in the economy. 
Inflation measures the loss of money purchasing power, while deflation represents the 
opposite, where the general price levels decrease and cause a gain in money purchasing 
power. A hyperinflation represents a very high level of inflation, and the general threshold 
used by economists describes the term when the monthly inflation rate perceives 50 percent. 
Central banks in most countries prefer to keep a low, but positive inflation rate. A target rate 
is typically specified at one to three percent per year ("Inflation and deflation," N.D.; Salemi, 
2008; White, 2008). 
 
4.1.3 Economic Growth 
Economic growth can be described as the quantitative change or expansion in a country's 
economy and is measured as the yearly percentage increase in a country’s or economy’s GDP. 
An economic growth can either be “extensively” or “intensively” which means that the 
economy grows either by using more resources or by using the same amount of resources 
more efficiently. Inflation is an important factor, and affects economic growth. By 
considering the inflation rate one would get more accurate values of the economic growth. 
The economic growth where the inflation rate is taken in to consideration is called the real 
economic growth
5
 (Soubbotina, 2004). 
 
4.1.4 Balance of Payments (BOP) 
The balance of payments (BOP) accounts for a record of a country’s international 
transactions, a record of the country’s trade in goods, services, and financial assets with other 
countries.  
The BOP consists of the current account (CA), the capital account (CP), and the official 
reserve account (OR). 
BOP = CA + CP + OR = 0 
                                                 
5
 While the economic growth where the inflation rate is not taken into consideration is called the normative 
economic growth (Soubbotina, 2004). 
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“The current account records goods, services, and transfers into the country [,] the capital 
account records the flow of financial assets into and out of the country [, while] the official 
reserve account records the purchases and sales of foreign currency by the central banks” 
(Gärtner, 2006, p. 18). BOP compares the amount of exports and imports, and if all 
transactions are included, the payments and receipts must be equal. A BOP surplus or deficit 
occurs if more money is coming into the country than flowing out, and vice versa (Gärtner, 
2006; Stein, 2008). 
 
4.1.7 Income Distribution 
The term income distribution arises from people’s interactions through markets and is 
affected by the country's tax system. These interactions embrace people's attitudes and ability 
to work, their savings and investments. The term can be described as an average of national 
income divided among groups of individuals, households, social classes and factors of 
productions (Levy, 2008). 
 
4.2 Lender of Last Resort and Moral Hazard 
A lender of last resort (LOLR) provides funds and liquidity to financial institutions when they 
cannot borrow from the market. When no other lender is willing or capable to provide funds 
for institutions, a lender of last resort can step in to protect and prevent problems due to 
liquidity problems and to prevent sovereign debt crises. For the banking sector, a LOLR can 
help protect depositors, prevent panics from braking out, and help to prevent a collapse of the 
financial systems. Central banks typically hold the role as domestic lenders of last resort and 
are only available to deposit-taking banks in times of crisis. Joyce (2013) defines that the 
domestic lender of last resort “is to lend freely to temporarily illiquid but nonetheless solvent 
banks at penalty rate with good collateral” (p. 139). 
The IMF typically holds the role as an international lender of last resort. Joyce (2013) 
describes the IMF’s justifications as acting as an international lender of last resort, which is 
presented in table 4.1 on the next page. 
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Table 4.1: IMF’s Justifications as acting as an International Lender of Last Resort 
Source: (Joyce, 2013, pp. 140-141) 
1. There are externalities resulting from the occurrence of crises that are not 
incorporated in domestic decisions on crisis prevention. 
2. Multilateral lenders, such as the IMF, may be able to stop speculative runs due to 
coordination failures by supplying adequate liquidity. 
3. The IMF can deal with informational problems in private financial markets. 
4. The IMF can strengthen the position of domestic reformers through its lending 
programs. 
 
 
A big difference between a domestic and an international LOLR is that the domestic lender 
(central banks) has the possibility to create money, in addition to holding bank reserves, and 
can draw upon unlimited resources. This is not the case for international lenders, as the IMF, 
who only has the member countries’ quotas to draw upon for its lending. Another difference 
between these lenders is that the IMF has been reluctant to charge a penalty rate from its 
borrowers in order to make it easier for countries in need of financial assistance to seek help. 
The IMF’s low interest rates could encourage member countries to borrow more frequently 
and in larger amounts, which could create the situation known as moral hazard – which is 
further discussed in the next section (Buckley, 2011; Joyce, 2013; Kindleberger & Aliber, 
2011; Vreeland, 2007). 
 
4.2.1 Moral Hazard 
A lender of last resort could lead to the term known as moral hazard, where the availability of 
funds and bailouts could lead to reckless behavior from both debtors and creditors in terms 
excessive risk taking. Bird (2007, p. 692) states that "Moral hazard occurs where action 
designed to alleviate a problem creates incentives that may actually make it worse". One way 
to look at moral hazard is in a way of an insurance, where the insured party's incentives are 
reduced and is encouraged to make preventive actions. A party may be more willing to take a 
greater risk, knowing that the cost and burdens will be borne by another party. In the case of 
IMF lending, the topic widely discussed is that rescues from international lending institutions 
encourages lenders and borrowers to behave irresponsibly. The IMF's support comes in form 
of loans that are to be repaid with interest, not a simple cash payout as would have been the 
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case if an actual insurer would provide the insurance. The "insurance benefit" provided by the 
IMF is lower interest rates, which is different from other lending institutions who in times of 
crisis may carry very high interest rates (T. Lane & Phillips, 2000). 
Moral hazard concerns both creditor-side and debtor-side moral hazard. Creditor-side moral 
hazard can be described as a greater willingness to lend. Investors might be more likely to 
lend excessively to member countries at low interest rates without taking the full risk into 
consideration. Noy (2008, p. 65) states that "an (implied) insurance of bond issues or inter-
bank lending can lead to the following: (1) an increase in the amount lent; (2) a decrease in 
the price of loans so that it no longer reflects insurance-free risk; (3) a change in the 
composition of investment away from uninsured investment (e.g., equity) to insured flows 
(e.g., sovereign bonds); and (4) a change in the composition of international portfolios away 
from less risky but less profitable investment opportunities to more risky but more profitable 
ones if outcomes are positive." Likewise, member countries may not undertake the risks of 
borrowing and act in an imprudent way if there is a chance that they could be (at least 
partially) bailed out in the case of balance of payment problems, and increase the likelihood 
of a crisis. This scenario describes the debtor-side of moral hazard (T. Lane & Phillips, 2002; 
Lee & Shin, 2008). 
 
4.2.2 Too Big to Fail 
Some companies are in a manner “too big to fail” (TBTF); that the business has become so 
large, interconnected and important to the economy (and society) that a failure could cause a 
disastrous ripple effect for the entire financial system. These businesses must be supported by 
governments when facing difficulties, because the cost of a bailout may be less than the cost 
of the failure to the economy and society as a whole (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
N.D.). 
The failure of one large bank in a country, for example, could cause a domino effect resulting 
in indebtedness and failure of other banks, and in worst case scenario; cause failure of every 
other bank in the country. Further, the systemic risk is that the problems in one financial 
institution spread and endanger the entire financial system (Buckley, 2011). One example of 
this is US banks, as emphasized in an article by Michael Snyderin (2013) in the blog “The 
Economic Collapse“, where he states that the six largest banks in the United States have 
become so big that they have outcompeted 1,400 smaller banks during the last five years, and 
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now control 67 percent of all US banking assets. This makes the banks JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley crucially 
important for the US economy, and a collapse of these banks would mostly guaranteed result 
in a brutal economic depression. The author explains this situation as that the banks have 
become “too colossal to collapse”. “Our entire economy is based on credit, and these giant 
banks are at the very core of our system of credit” (Snyderin, 2013). 
Moral hazard becomes a problem when too big to fail companies deliberately take high-risk 
high-return chances, as they are able to carry these risks with a bailout insurance held by 
governments. This does not only cause excessive risk on businesses itself, but on the entire 
economy. The moral hazard goes both ways, and cause imprudent behavior in both debtor and 
creditor-side of these companies, squeezing out competition and creating danger to the 
financial systems. As former Federal Reserve Chairman of the United States, Alan Greenspan, 
explains the situation regarding US banks when referring to the danger of a collapse in the 
financial system; “If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big” (McKee & Lanman, 2009). 
Buckley (2011) suggests that one should try to prevent big banks from growing too big in the 
first place or to break up the largest banks into smaller units, as big banks are difficult to 
regulate and manage. 
 
4.3 Financial Crises 
We want to look deeper into the relationship between IMF participation and the probability of 
future currency, banking and twin crises. In this section we outline brief theoretical insights to 
financial crises, balance of payments problems, and financial distress. In addition we give 
insights to events that have occurred in economic history. 
Countries, banks, individuals, and firms again and again build up excessively high debt in 
good times without taking into account the risk that will follow when the inevitable recession 
hits. In many cases, players in the global financial system build up much more debt than they 
can reasonably expect to escape from in the future. Financial crises are not some new 
phenomenon, but have been around since the development of money and financial markets. 
There are different reasons why crises occur; countries may have difficulties handling their 
foreign debt, or there may be a financial distress on a world basis (Vreeland, 2007). 
Nesvetailova (2007, p. 26) claim that financial crises, in one way or another, “always result 
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from some policy miscalculation or governmental ineptness, plain corruption or a severe 
external shock to the economic system”. 
Financial crises often occur in clusters and follow a rhythm of boom and bust through periods 
of time. It is very difficult to predict the timing of debt crises, since it is the nature of 
confidence and the dependence on the public’s expectations on future events that marks the 
start of a crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) state again and again in their book; that even 
though people and governments, when referring to previous crises and periods of financial 
distress, claim that the current time is different from other periods of distress; the truth is that 
we have definitely been here before. This is what the authors call the this-time-is-different 
syndrome. 
“The essence of the this-time-is-different syndrome is simple. It is rooted in the firmly 
held belief that financial crises are things that happen to other people in other countries 
at other times; crises do not happen to us, here and now. We are doing things better, 
we are smarter, we have learned from past mistakes. The old rules of valuation no 
longer apply. Unfortunately, a highly leveraged economy can unwittingly be sitting 
with its back at the edge of a financial cliff for many years before chance and 
circumstances provoke a crisis of confidence that pushes it off” (2009, p. 1). 
As the world gets more interconnected in terms of trade and financial channels, distress in one 
country’s financial and corporate sectors is more closely linked to external financial 
difficulties and exchange rate instabilities. The distinctions between different types of crises 
are not clear-cut either, as imbalances in one sector often transfer into others and may lead 
liquidity problems to insolvency (IMF, 2002; Nesvetailova, 2007). 
 
4.3.2 Different Types of Financial Crises: 
Both sovereign debt crises and banking crises can be traced long back in history, through 
centuries and across regions. Many advanced economies seem to have “graduated” from 
sovereign debt crises after a historical periodic bout of government insolvency, while these 
crises remain a recurring problem in emerging markets. Banking crises, however, still remain 
a recurring problem everywhere, affecting rich and poor countries alike (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009). Different types of financial crises include inflation crises, currency crises, sovereign 
debt crises and banking crises. 
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4.3.2.1 Inflation Crises 
Inflation crises occur when any unexpected increase in inflation takes place and allows all 
debtors to repay their debts in currency with much less purchasing power. The debt is 
inflating away, and many high-inflation crises often last for many years. It is very difficult for 
countries to escape these situations, to permanent graduate, if they have had a long history of 
high and volatile inflation. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) use a threshold of 20 percent per 
annum to define an inflation crisis. As further discussed in this thesis; banking crises indicates 
a likely rise in sovereign defaults in addition to signal a potential rise in a country’s inflation 
rate. There can also be found a close connection between inflation crises and currency crashes 
– which is discussed in the next section. “In most cases, high inflation and collapsing 
exchange rates result from a government’s abuse of its self-proclaimed monopoly on currency 
issuance” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009, p. 180). Countries that have experienced sustained high 
inflation often shift towards using foreign hard currency, often towards dollarization. This 
again may lead to a weakening of a country’s currency monopoly, which can take a long time 
to destabilize. 
Throughout history, every continent - especially countries in emerging market phases, has 
experienced multiple episodes of high inflation, often long-lasting and recurrent. No emerging 
country in history has managed to avoid periods of high inflation, and from the twentieth 
century, episodes of high inflation have spiked radically. After World War II, Africa and 
Latin America represent the two regions that have experienced the highest degree of inflation, 
with the 1980s and 1990s as the most intense periods (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009).  
 
4.3.2.2 Currency Crises 
“A foreign exchange, or currency, crisis occurs when a speculative attack on a country's 
currency results in a devaluation or sharp depreciation or forces the central bank to defend the 
currency by selling large amounts of reserves or by significantly raising interest rates” (IMF, 
2002). A sharp decline in a country’s demand for domestic currency, as mentioned – often 
triggered by high inflation, often leads to reserve losses, an increase in short-term interest 
rates, a depreciation of a country’s currency against another country’s currency, or a 
combination of these three situations (Nesvetailova, 2007). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) define 
a currency crash (crisis) as an annual depreciation of a country’s currency versus the US 
dollar (or the relevant anchor currency) with 15 percent per annum or more. Currency crisis 
can be caused by speculative disturbances based on anticipations of future policies, which 
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may be based on bad experiences with previous administrations in a country and a lack of 
private sector credibility. Expectations of a devaluation of a country’s exchange rate may lead 
to an investor bailout, caused by anticipated unattractive interest rates. Investors turn to other 
countries, causing large capital outflows and losses of international reserves (Nesvetailova, 
2007). 
The Mexican crisis of 1982 is one example of currency crisis to emphasize in this section. 
Mexico became a major oil exporting country in the mid-1970s, where oil export accounted 
for 60 percent of their earnings by the mid-1980s. The Mexican government’s expenditures in 
this period exceeded their export earnings and the deficit was partly covered by monetary 
emission, partly by foreign earnings. This led to a fast growing inflation in the country, which 
again led to an increased real exchange rate of the peso. In early 1982, the American demand 
for Mexican exports declined, which made the Mexican government devalue the peso in 
response. “Devaluation, however, failed to reassure foreign commercial banks in the 
government’s policy credibility. By the summer 1982, the traditional sources of foreign 
borrowing were exhausted, and Mexico was left with an unsustainable debt burden” 
(Nesvetailova, 2007, p. 37). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) in addition emphasize other 
exchange rate crisis since the 1990s; Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2001.  
 
4.3.2.3 Sovereign Debt Crises: 
Sovereign default describes when a government fails to meet principal or interest payment on 
due date or within the grace period of the loan. A debt crisis can also occur when lenders 
withhold new loans and try to liquidate existing loans in believe that default is likely to take 
place (IMF, 2002). Serial defaults refer to multiple or several sovereign defaults on external 
or domestic public (or publicly guaranteed) debt, or both. External debt crises involve default 
on a government’s external debt obligations. This includes payments to creditors in other 
countries, typically held mostly by foreign creditors and denominated in foreign currencies. 
Domestic debt crises involve default on a government’s public debt issued under the country’s 
own legal jurisdiction, typically held mainly by residents and denominated in the local 
currency. In addition to defaults on principal or interest payments, domestic debt crises have 
involved the freezing of bank deposits and/or forcible conversions of such deposits from 
dollars to local currency (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
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Many countries, especially emerging markets, can be defined as debt-intolerant. These debt-
intolerant countries experience extreme difficulties managing their external debts, typically 
resulting from loss in market confidence, spiraling interest rates on external government debt, 
and political resistance to repaying foreign creditors. This may lead to serial defaults, and 
once a country has become a serial defaulter, a recovery may take decades or even centuries 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
One recent example of a sovereign debt crisis is the ongoing crisis in Europe. The global 
financial crisis which entered its first phase in August 2007 in the United States, also known 
as the Great Recession, triggered major reassessment among investors in the euro area, and 
caused a severe shock in all of Europe. “In turn, the combined impact of domestic recessions, 
banking-sector distress, and the decline in risk appetite among international investors would 
fuel the conditions for a sovereign debt crisis” (P. R. Lane, 2012, p. 54). So far, the most 
severe crises in the euro area have been in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, followed by Italy 
and Spain. 
 
4.3.2.4 Banking Crises: 
Banks traditionally borrow at short term, but they usually provide loans at the same time with 
far longer maturity. This means that banks may face difficulties converting their loans into 
cash on short notice. If, for instance, a panic occurs and the depositors all try to withdraw 
their funds at once, the banks will experience trouble providing these funds and may not be 
able to pay off the panicked depositors. Heavy investments losses and/or banking panics 
resulting in bank insolvency are typical reasons for the outbreak of a banking crisis. A 
banking crisis can be described as an event where there are significant signs of financial 
distress in the banking system that leads to bank runs which again leads to closure, 
bankruptcy, merging, significantly losses in the banking system, and/or takeover by the public 
sector. 
Systemic banking crises (SBC) are severe and can be defined as those crises that are 
connected with recessions. SBC are rare events, and recessions following a SBC are often 
deeper and more long-lasting than other recessions. Advanced economies tend to have worse 
outcomes of banking crises than emerging and developing countries, in terms of real effects. 
A deeper banking system makes a banking crisis more disruptive and cause larger output 
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losses and larger increase in public debt (Boissay, Collard, & Smets, 2013; Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009). 
The Nordic banking crisis in Norway, Sweden and Finland are good examples to mention in 
this section, with emphasize on the Norwegian banking crisis. These Nordic countries 
experienced systemic banking crises in the early 1990s, whereof the Norwegian banking crisis 
lasted from 1988 to 1993, and preceded the crises in Sweden and Finland by one year. The 
Norwegian crisis followed a similar pattern as other countries in crises. “Among them were: 
prior to the crisis; deregulation of a heavily regulated financial sector immediately followed 
by an excessive increase in bank lending, and a boom followed by a bust particularly in real 
estate prices” (Moe, Solheim, & Vale, 2004, p. 3). Norway managed to reduce its interest 
rates considerably in 1992 as it de-pegged its currency from ECU and let the krone float, were 
by 1994 the losses of the crisis were minuscule (Moe et al., 2004).  
 
4.3.2.5 Twin Crises 
Twin crises can be described as the simultaneous occurrence of two economic crises; currency 
crises with bank crises, currency crises with sovereign debt crises, or banking crises with 
sovereign debt crises. The occurrence of currency crises along with either banking or 
sovereign debt crises are the most common cases of twin crises. Most bank crises are 
accompanied by currency or sovereign debt crisis, but not necessarily vice versa. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) found that banking crises most commonly precede balance of payments 
distress. Laeven and Valencia (2012) found that in the same country, within three years 
following the start of a banking crisis, 21 percent of banking crises are followed by a currency 
crisis and five percent are followed by a sovereign debt crisis. Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) 
points out that nearly all of the banking crises since the early 1980s have been associated with 
currency crises, with a few exceptions – such as the banking crisis in Ireland in 2008 and 
2009. Twin crises tend be more severe than individual banking and currency crises, and have 
been found to be more frequent in developing countries and emerging markets than in 
industrial countries. Examples of dual banking and currency crises include Chile in 1982, 
Finland in 1992, Sweden in 1992 and Mexico in 1994 – among many other incidents (Hagen 
& Ho, 2003; Joyce, 2013; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Laeven & Valencia, 2012). 
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4.4 Economic Distress through History 
This section will start by introducing the big ten financial bubbles we have experienced 
throughout history, presented by Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) in table 4.2 below. As we 
can see from the table, six out of the ten biggest bubbles in history have occurred since the 
1970s. The history of financial distress and crises further discussed in this section will 
emphasize episodes starting from the 1970, as it is most relevant for investigating the IMF’s 
intentions, and the macroeconomic effects of their lending arrangements. 
 
Table 4.2: The Big ten Financial Bubbles. Source: (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011, p. 11) 
1. The Dutch Tulip Bulb Bubble 1636 
2. The South Sea Bubble 1720 
3. The Mississippi Bubble 1720 
4. The late 1920s stock price bubble 1927–29 
5. The surge in bank loans to Mexico and other developing countries in the 1970s 
6. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan 1985–89 
7. The 1985–89 bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway and Sweden 
8. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and several 
other Asian countries 1992–97 and the surge in foreign investment in Mexico 1990-
99 
9. The bubble in over-the counter stocks in the United States 1995–2000 
10. The bubble in real estate in the United States, Britain, Spain, Ireland, and Iceland 
between 2002-2007 – and the debt of the government of Greece 
 
 
4.4.1 Economic Crises since the 1970s 
There have been four waves of financial crises since the early 1970s, each followed by a wave 
of recession and credit bubbles. The common feature among these waves of crises is that the 
financial troubles resulted from the impacts of monetary shocks and credit market shocks on 
the direction and scope of cross-border money flows – which in several cases occurred at the 
same time (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011). 
“The monetary shocks involved unanticipated changes in the rates of money supply 
growth and the accompanying impacts on anticipated inflation rates and on interest 
rates. The credit market shocks involved the relaxation of financial regulations that 
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allowed the banks to increase their loans to specific groups of borrowers, who then 
became more attractive to lenders” (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011, p. 282). 
The first wave of crises found place in the 1980s in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and ten other 
developing countries, when they defaulted on their USD 800 billion US dollar-denominated 
loans. The 1980s became what has become called the Third World debt crisis, or the “lost 
decade” for Latin America. The second wave of crises include the “Big Five” banking crises 
in Japan, Spain and the three Nordic countries; Finland, Norway and Sweden in the early 
1990s. The third wave began in mid-1997 with the Asian Financial crisis, including Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia – which preceded the crises in South Korea, Russia, Brazil, and 
Argentina. Finally, the fourth wave started in 2007 after a relatively calm period, known as 
the Big Recession, and was triggered by declines in the prices of real estate in the United 
States, Great Britain, Spain, Ireland, and Iceland – followed by declines in prices of bonds of 
the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish governments (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011; Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009) 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) (based on research from Beim & Calmoris (2001), the World 
Bank (2002), Sturzenegger & Zettlemeyer (2006), and the IMF) identify 66 episodes of 
sovereign debt crises and debt restructuring during the period from 1970-2011, where three of 
these episodes took place during 2008-2011. Additionally, Greece restructured its public debt 
in the first half of 2012. In the same time period there have been a total of 211 currency crises 
and 147 banking crises worldwide, where several countries have experienced multiple crises. 
Only two countries, Argentina and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have experienced 
more than two banking crises during this time period. Figure 4.1 below shows the range and 
frequency of systemic banking crises from 1970 to 2011 (Laeven & Valencia, 2012).  
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Figure 4.1: Frequency of Systemic Banking Crises around the World, 1970-2011 
Source: (Laeven & Valencia, 2012, p. 9) 
 
4.4.3 Outcomes of Crises 
The decades following the 1980s have caused more collapses in national banking systems 
than in any previous comparable period. This period has been the most troubled in monetary 
history - this is in terms of the number, scope, and severity of financial crises. “The loan 
losses of banks in Japan, in Sweden, Norway and Finland, in Thailand and Malaysia and 
Indonesia, and in Mexico (twice), in Brazil and Argentina, and in the United States and 
Britain and Iceland and Ireland ranged from 10 to 50 percent of their assets” (Kindleberger & 
Aliber, 2011, p. 278). The losses in some countries during this period were much bigger than 
those in the US during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Most of the banking crises in this 
period were systemic and, as mentioned earlier, nearly all of the banking crises since the early 
1980s were associated with currency crises – making the outcomes even more severe. Many 
of these countries turned to the IMF as a lender of last resort in order to help limit the 
deregulation of their currencies, but many were reluctant due to that the policy conditions of 
the Fund would deflate their economies (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011). 
Table 4.3 below shows the outcomes from banking crises during the time period 1970-2011 as 
presented by Laeven and Valencia (2012), where four main variables measure the outcomes; 
the fiscal cost of a crisis, the output losses, the increase in public debt, and the peak in 
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nonperforming loans (NPL’s). “The increase in public debt is measured as the change in the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio over the four-year period beginning with the crisis year” (Laeven & 
Valencia, 2012, p. 15). As we can see, the advanced countries have bigger output losses and 
larger increases in debt than the emerging and developing countries. As mentioned before, 
deeper financial and banking systems in the advanced economies tend to cause more 
disruptive outcomes of a crisis- which is shown in table below. 
 
Table 4.3: Banking Crises Outcomes, 1970–2011 
Source: (Laeven & Valencia, 2012, p. 17 Table 2) 
Country Output 
loss 
Increase 
in debt 
Monetary 
expansion 
Fiscal 
costs 
Fiscal 
costs 
Duration Peak 
liquidity 
Liquidity 
support 
Peak 
NPLs 
 Medians 
In percent of GDP In 
percent 
of 
financial 
system 
assets 
In years In percent of 
deposits and foreign 
liabilities 
In 
percent 
of total 
loans 
All 23.0 12.1 1.7 6.8 12.7 2.0 20.1 9.6 25.0 
Advanced 32.9 21.4 8.3 3.8 2.1 3.0 11.5 5.7 4.0 
Emerging 26.0 9.1 1.3 10.0 21.4 2.0 22.3 11.1 30.0 
Developing 1.3 10.9 1.2 10.0 18.3 1.0 22.6 12.3 37.5 
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5. IMF INTERVENTION 
Up until the year 2000 about one quarter of the world was in an arrangement with the IMF, 
during any given year. This makes the IMF intervention quite large and common on a world 
basis (Vreeland, 2007). The Fund may have several active programs at once, but the number 
of programs varies from year to year. The distribution of different lending arrangements has 
also changed during the lifetime of the IMF. Table A2 shows the number of ongoing 
arrangements and amounts committed from the IMF to member countries from 1953 to 2013. 
This chapter of the thesis will provide brief insights to IMF intervention through history and 
try to create an overview of their lending arrangements on a worldwide basis.  
Figure 5.1 below shows the number of approved arrangements on a year basis from 1970-
2011. As we can see, the Fund has had a varying number of arrangements during these years, 
and there have also been a big variance is the distribution of the different lending 
arrangements. The stand-by arrangements (SBA) have been the main lending arrangements 
for years, but during the last decades the Fund has made a shift in the distribution of total 
lending arrangements, where of the fiscal year of 2013, 17 percent of the total ongoing 
lending arrangements were SBAs while the poverty reduction and growth trust arrangements 
(PRGT) accounted for 60.9 percent (IMF, 2013g). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: IMF Arrangement Approved: 1970-2011 
Source: (Joyce, 2013, p. 198) 
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The lending support from the IMF was in a declining period in the beginning of the 2000s, but 
the activities increased radically again after the global financial crises hit in 2008-9. The 
number of new lending arrangements fell from 26 in 2001 to eight in 2008, and then 
drastically increased to 28 in 2009 (IMF, 2013g). 
The amounts committed from the Fund have drastically increased in time, from SDR
6
 55 
million (USD 82.9 million) in ongoing arrangements in 1953 to SDR 152.5 million (USD 230 
million) in 2013. While the PRGT is the most frequent ongoing lending arrangement by the 
Fund in 2013, it accounts for the smallest amount committed (1.9 percent). The lending 
arrangement that accounts for the biggest amount committed by the Fund is the flexible credit 
line (FFL) which accounts for 7.32 percent of the arrangements and 47.9 percent of the 
amounts committed in 2013. Figure 5.2 below presents the amounts committed each year by 
the IMF from 1970 to 2011. As we can see, the most drastically increase has taken place since 
2009, after the hit of the Great Recession. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Amounts Committed under IMF Lending Arrangements: 1970-2011 
Source: (Joyce, 2013, p. 199) 
  
                                                 
6
 “On April 30, 2013, the SDR/U.S. dollar exchange rate was US$1 = SDR 0.662691, and the U.S. dollar/SDR 
exchange rate was SDR 1 = US$1.509” (IMF, 2013g, p. 3). 
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5.1 IMF Lending Through History 
The IMF lending is supposed to be temporary; the different lending arrangements are intended 
to last from one to five years in order to help countries with their balance of payment 
problems. The average length of IMF arrangements is 5.5 years, with 5.2 years among 
countries with no past history with the Fund. The overall pattern seems to be extensive 
participation, especially among developing countries. The typical pace of re-entering for 
developing countries is that they stay five years under an IMF arrangement, then spend five 
years without, then re-enter an arrangement for another five years, and so on. There are some 
extreme cases of time spent under IMF under consecutive arrangements and these include; 
South Korea - that spent 13 years from 1965-1977, Zaire spent 14 years straight from 1976-
1989, Liberia spent 15 years from 1963-1977, and Haiti that spent 21 years under consecutive 
arrangements up until 1990 (Vreeland, 2007). 
During the 1980s debt crisis, from 1982 to 1985, “the IMF engaged in twenty-five lending 
arrangements with thirteen heavily indebted countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay in Central America and South America, and 
Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia” (Joyce, 2013, p. 58). During this 
period, many of the policy conditions attached the programs were not fully implemented, and 
the programs often broke down. Only eleven of these arrangements were fully utilized, and 
several were modified during its duration time. During the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s, 
the IMF engaged in lending arrangements with Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Russia 
was also in an arrangement with the Fund during the 1990s, and Argentina, Brazil, Spain and 
Turkey turn to IMF during the early 2000s – to mention a few noteworthy examples. From the 
IMF’s first agreement in 1952 up until 2000 there have been a total of 936 separate IMF 
arrangements that spanned a total of 1,838 country-years. 725 of these arrangements have 
taken place from the 1970s, whereof 594 were short-term and mid-term stabilization 
programs.  Latin America represents the region with most arrangements, and by 1965 every 
Latin American country had participated in an IMF arrangement – most of them on a 
repeating basis (Barro & Lee, 2003; Joyce, 2013; Vreeland, 2007). 
Even though most countries have participated in lending arrangements with the IMF, some 
countries have yet never turned to the Fund for support - and these are listed in table A3. A 
few of these countries are not members of the IMF, such as North Korea, Lichtenstein, and 
Nauru, but most of the countries are currently members. Vreeland (2007) states that there are 
no obvious reasons for their non-participation. Some of these countries are resource rich, such 
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as the oil-rich countries of the Middle East and diamond-exporting Botswana – but being 
resource rich does not explain the existing pattern of IMF lending. 
 
5.1.1 The Barrier of the First Time Borrower 
It is said that if a country first has signed an agreement with the IMF, it is more likely to make 
an agreement with the Fund in the future. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000, p. 61) state that 
"Countries with no previous experience with IMF programs are less likely to enter into an 
IMF arrangement even when facing bad economic conditions; one reason is that governments 
face a more severe stigma for sacrificing national sovereignty in these situations". Pride is one 
major factor that implies that a country is reluctant to seek help, and tries as best as it can to 
manage its financial difficulties on its own. When this barrier first is broken, it is easier to ask 
the Fund for help at a later point. Governments are more likely to seek financial help from the 
IMF if former leaders previously have done the same. The threshold isn't as high then as for 
first time borrowers. There is a pattern that shows that the proportion of countries entering 
IMF arrangements with past experience is two to four times greater than countries with no 
previous experience with the Fund  One example of this is Nigeria, who entered its first 
arrangement in 1987, following with a new arrangement in 1989, and a third one in 1991 
(Vreeland, 2007). 
 
5.2 Ongoing IMF Arrangements 
By the end of the fiscal year 2013, the Fund had 41 ongoing lending arrangements, accounting 
for SDR 152.5 million (USD 230 million). During the last year there were approved twelve 
new arrangements; five under the IMF’s non-concessional financing facilities and additionally 
seven new arrangements to low-income countries (concessional loans) – which together 
accounted for SDR 75.5 million (USD 114 million). What is noteworthy here is that the 
number of new arrangements approved by the Fund once again is in a declining period. 
“Successor arrangements under the Flexible Credit Line for Mexico and Poland accounted for 
the vast majority of the amount committed, and a sizable percentage of the amount disbursed 
went to three euro area countries with IMF programs” (IMF, 2013g, p. 11). Table 5.1 on the 
next page presents the arrangements approved by the Fund during the fiscal year of 2013. The 
numbers and amounts committed follow the same trend as the Fund’s ongoing lending 
arrangements, with the PRGT as the most frequent arrangement in quantity, while the FCL 
accounts for the largest amounts approved. 
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Table 5.1 IMF Arrangements Approved during the Financial Year Ended April 30, 2013 
Source: (IMF, 2013g) 
Member Type of Arrangement Amounts Approved 
(millions of SDRs) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Jordan 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Poland 
Central African 
Republic 
Gambia, The 
Liberia 
Malawi 
Säo Tomé and Príncipe 
Solomon Islands 
Burkina Faso 
Tanzania 
Mali 
Stand-By 
Stand-By 
Flexible Credit Line 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line 
Flexible Credit Line 
 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
338.2 
1,364.0 
47,292.0 
4,117.4 
22,000.0 
 
41.8 
18.7 
51.7 
104.1 
2.6 
1.0 
36.1 
149.2 
12.0 
Total  75,528.8 
 
 
By the end of the fiscal year 2013, eight European countries
7
 were participation in IMF 
arrangements, accounting for 62 percent of the IMF’s total disbursing and precautionary 
commitments. In the most recent financial years, a number of European countries have 
requested support from the IMF, including Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, and Portugal due to the 
financial distress after the hit of the Great Recession. As mentioned earlier, the Fund has 
recently been resurrected in the advanced economies after decades of activities mainly 
concentrated in underdeveloped and developing countries. There were established joint 
European Union/IMF programs for each of these European countries during 2010-2012 which 
provided conditions to implement fiscal austerity and structural reforms to boost growth 
(especially in Greece and Portugal), and recapitalize and deleverage overextended banking 
                                                 
7
 “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Romania (Stand-By Arrangements), Greece, Ireland, Moldova, and 
Portugal (Extended Fund Facility), and Poland (Flexible Credit Line) (IMF, 2013g, p. 19). 
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systems (especially in Ireland). The lending required for these countries far exceeded normal 
IMF lending amounts, leading the European Union to act as the major fund provider (IMF, 
2013g; P. R. Lane, 2012). 
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6. THE EFFECTS OF IMF ARRANGEMENTS 
It is hard to distinguish the effects of IMF intervention from those events that would have 
otherwise occurred. The consequences of IMF arrangements crucially depend on the structure 
of the economy, the specific terms of the stabilization program, the level of program 
implementation (conditionality) and the structure of poverty in the borrowing country 
(Garuda, 2000). Haque and Khan (1998) emphasize in their study that the IMF supported 
programs is only one of many macroeconomic shocks the participating countries experience. 
“External shocks, such as changes in the terms of trade or in the cost of servicing foreign debt, 
will also affect the country’s ability to achieve the macroeconomic objectives of the program. 
Measures of program effectiveness have to filter out these unanticipated exogenous shocks” 
(1998, p. 5). Steinwand and Stone (2008) focus on whether ineffective IMF programs are 
caused by poorly designed arrangements or that the arrangements are poorly implemented by 
the recipient member countries. Other difficulties one has to consider when studying this topic 
is the time aspect; one cannot assume that the effects of IMF programs follow a linear path 
over time or that the effects measured on some economic variables will be matched by similar 
effects on others (Bird, 2001). There is no completely satisfactory means to say exactly what a 
country will experience when participating in an IMF arrangement, but it is more likely that 
one can find out and understand the typical effect of an outcome. The most typical outcomes 
from IMF arrangements do not make headlines - it is rather the worst cases that are discussed 
in the public (Vreeland, 2007). IMF arrangements are as mentioned quite common, and the 
participation rates are increasing – see figure 6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1: Number of countries participating in IMF programs 1946 to 2000 
Source: (Vreeland, 2007, p. 10) 
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In order to study the effect of IMF arrangements, one has to be able to identify and separate 
the circumstances that are due to the IMF’s arrangements and what are due to other 
circumstances. Different research techniques do not always give the same results, and a 
number of researches have published studies with different approaches and hence; different 
results. The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of IMF’s intentions, the critiques 
against the Fund, and finally, the effects of the lending arrangements presented from different 
studies. The heated issue regarding IMF lending arrangements and the possibility that the 
Fund’s activities encourage moral hazard will also be investigated at the end of this chapter. 
 
6.1 IMF Transparency 
One issue that has made IMF programs difficult to investigate is the level of transparency 
from the Fund itself. Most details about their programs have been kept confidential up until 
the last few decades, which have made it difficult to investigate IMF intervention - at least 
studying the degree of countries’ implementation and compliance with the policy conditions. 
The Fund made a policy shift after the East Asian financial crises in the late 1990s and made 
at least some portions of nearly all letters of intent (LOI) publicly available through their 
website. Some publications from the Fund are first published five years after their issuance, 
and some are not publicly available before ten or twenty years after issuance. However, even 
though some details about IMF arrangements now are available to the public, the level of 
details in the publications makes it complicated to evaluate and observe the intended 
outcomes from the Fund. There are still some negotiations between the IMF and governments 
that are kept secret from the public of the recipient countries and the general public as a 
whole. Özgür (2009) believes that this secrecy affect both the governments’ liabilities and the 
public confidence in the IMF, and suggest that any unfavorable information, in addition to all 
letters of intent, should be made public immediately (Vreeland, 2007; Özgür, 2009). 
 
6.2 Countries’ Relationship with the US 
Many decisions in the IMF that are based on votes most often calls on a majority from the 
member countries, sometimes by 85 percent. As mentioned before, the United States holds the 
largest quota in the Fund, together with 16.75 percent of the votes per 2013. This amount of 
votes is large enough to give the United States veto power in decisions that require 85 percent 
majority of the votes. The five countries that counts for the largest amount of quotas and 
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voting power in the IMF is the United States, Japan, Germany, the UK and France (IMF, 
2013a; Vreeland, 2007). Some countries are said to have a better chance in getting softer 
conditions than others, and countries facing better conditions are countries that either political 
or on other terms have some prior connection with the IMF. Many critics have stated that the 
US has too much voting power in the IMF, and that the outcomes of the Fund's decisions 
heavily rely on the countries’ relationship with the US. Systematically differences among IMF 
arrangements thus may lead to biased results when comparing participating countries 
(Vreeland, 2007).  
Barro and Lee (2003) mention a common claim against the IMF; that the Fund plays the role 
that is best suited for its biggest shareholder – the United States. They conducted a study to 
investigate this issue, and the focus of their study was short-term stabilization programs (SBA 
and EFF) in 130 countries during 1975-99. They investigated the number of quotas, the 
countries’ nationals among the IMF professional staff of economists8, voting patterns in the 
United Nations, and the extent of bilateral trade linkages in order to study each country’s 
political and economic connection to the most influential members of the IMF. Their analysis 
shows that “IMF loans are more likely to exist and to be larger in size when countries have 
larger quotas, more nationals on the IMF staff, and are more connected politically and 
economically to the United States and the major Western European countries” (2003, p. 2). 
Vreeland (2007) has cited several studies that come to the same conclusion as Barro and Lee, 
which includes studies by Tony Killick (1995), Strom Thacker (1999), Graham Bird and Dane 
Rowlands (2001), and Randall Stone (2004). 
 
6.3 IMF Conditionality 
The IMF has policy conditions attached to its loans because it believes that the need for a loan 
is a result of bad economic policies in the demanding country, and the conditions are intended 
to help the country to recover in the long run. As mentioned earlier countries may require 
loans, or the first tranche of their loans, up until 25 percent of its quota without any policy 
conditions attached. The Fund recognizes that these loan requests may not always be a result 
of bad economic policies, but rather just bad luck, and does not necessarily believe that they 
will lead to moral hazard (Vreeland, 2007). The conditionality is not legally enforceable, and 
                                                 
8
 “Officially, to avoid conflicts of interest, the IMF does not allow staff members to have a direct influence on 
lending decisions for their home country” (Barro & Lee, 2003, p. 8). 
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if a country does not comply with the Fund’s policy conditions, the maximum penalty the 
Fund can impose is to exempt the current country from future IMF lending arrangements 
(Evrensel & Kim, 2006). 
The policy conditions attached to each loan varies according to program type, but even among 
programs of the same type there are large variations depending on each individual case. The 
IMF conditions are broad, but are mostly intended to lower consumption, especially in the 
public sector. The conditions often include structural reforms in terms of “trade liberalization, 
price liberalization, privatization, the introduction of indirect means of monetary control, 
foreign-exchange market liberalization, banking-system restructuring, tax reform, subsidy 
cuts, and changes in the structure of government spending” (Fischer, 1997, p. 25). Over time, 
the conditions from the IMF have become more and more specific, from very simple to 
containing more and more detailed conditions. For example, the conditions attached to Peru’s 
loan in 1954
9
 was a promise from the Peruvian government to “lower domestic consumption 
by stabilizing the country’s fiscal position, which involved a slowing down of some 
investment projects already under way and the postponement of additional investment 
expenditures” (Vreeland, 2007, p. 22). The conditions attached to Peru’s arrangement in 1963 
contained fiscal- and monetary conditions, while the arrangement in 1993 in addition 
contained “targets for international reserves, limitations of foreign debt, a prohibition against 
import restrictions, further provisions for trade liberalization, as well as conditions calling for 
privatization and the deregulation of labor laws” (p. 22). 
The original conditions of the Fund have been called “macro-conditionality”, but in the 1990s 
the overall number of conditions had increased, and the level of details had become so great 
that the term shifted to “micro-conditionality”. It is the micro-conditionality that has been 
under attack when referring to the handling of crises after the 1990s – that the conditions 
attached to IMF arrangements were too many and too detailed to be followed. In response to 
this criticism, the IMF has stated that lack of commitment from the participating countries has 
been the rout of the problems (Vreeland, 2007). Other criticism towards the IMF 
conditionality is that the conditions impose reforms that do not correspond to local conditions 
and that they promote the interest of investors rather than the interests of the borrowers 
(Steinwand & Stone, 2008). Some critics claim that the policy conditions from the IMF in fact 
exacerbate the economic problems that led to the economic problems in the first place, 
                                                 
9
 This was the first IMF arrangement with a developing country. 
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something that only lead countries to return to the Fund on a repeating basis (Vreeland, 2007). 
One example of this is the actions of rapid privatization that is often demanded by the Fund 
without preparing the countries with the necessary infrastructure. Özgür (2009, p. 90) 
emphasize that even though “it has been argued that IMF programs are the products of mutual 
negotiations between the Fund and the member country, it is generally agreed that the Fund, 
which is the powerful side of the negotiations, imposes its actions on member countries”. 
 
6.3.1 Implementation of Conditionality (Compliance) 
Before there can be drawn any conclusions that the policy conditions from the IMF cause any 
effect in one way or another, it is important to investigate if governments actually follow 
through with these conditions. We want to figure out if the countries participating in IMF 
arrangements keep their part of the deal, with compliance of the policy conditions - and to 
what extent. Some governments succeed in having a larger degree of implementation than 
others, and according to Killick et al. (1990) a large portion of all programs break down 
during their intended lifestyle. The macroeconomic effects of IMF lending arrangements 
further discussed in this thesis are to a large extent affected by the policy conditions of the 
Fund, as they are a large part of each arrangement. There are two types of critiques regarding 
conditionality of the Fund’s policy conditions; one is that the negative outcomes of the 
arrangements are due to bad policy conditions, the other critique implies that the policy 
conditions, which are the correct ones, are not followed – and the real problems are due to the 
loans, not the conditions (Vreeland, 2007). 
Dreher (2003) lists several reasons for countries’ noncompliance. The first is that exogenous 
shocks might prevent the government from implementing the agreed conditions, and one 
example is that “a worsening of the external macroeconomic situation could lead to deficits or 
inflation rates higher than targeted” (p. 102). The second reason is that some of the loan 
conditions often contradict the recipient government’s own agenda, which governments may 
know in advance will never be implemented – and lead to a program interruption after a few 
tranches from the Fund. 
 
Approaches to Measure Compliance 
Vreeland (2007) mention two ways of measuring compliance, and the most basic and 
common measure is the percentage of the IMF loan that is used or “drawn” by a country, also 
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called an aggregate approach. A country can draw about 25 percent of the loan on approval 
of the loan arrangement, and the remaining amount is provided if the IMF staff determines 
that the government is in compliance with the attached policy conditions. Therefore, “if a 
government has drawn more than 25 percent of the loan, one can assume some degree of 
compliance with the arrangement policy conditions. If the government draws less than 100 
percent of the loan, however, one can assume some degree of noncompliance” (Vreeland, 
2007, p. 98). With this approach all policy conditions are gathered in one index, and one does 
not need to know the specific conditions from the Fund in order to investigate countries’ 
compliance. However, using this method implies that countries’ noncompliance is the only 
reason why 100 percent of the intended loan are not drawn, which can lead to misleading 
assumptions. There can be many reasons for countries not to draw the entire amount granted 
by the Fund; sometimes they do not need the entire loan package because they entered an 
arrangement only on a precautionary basis, or the reason they turn to the Fund may be that 
they want to signal to creditors that they are attempting to shore up their economies. Also, a 
country may experience compliance problems during the time period of the arrangements 
even if the full loan is disbursed. A third problem that may arise when using this approach to 
measure countries’ compliance is the possibility that powerful countries, such as the US, may 
pressure the IMF to treat strategically important allies more favorably, and hence; not follow 
through with the punishments
10
 on an equal country basis (Dreher, 2003; Vreeland, 2007). 
The other approach to measure compliance is called a disaggregate approach, which takes 
into account that the determinants and consequences of compliance in different policy 
dimensions may not be the same. Countries receive different policy conditions from the Fund, 
because no country faces exactly the same difficulties and does not requires the same need of 
help when turning to the Fund for support. Therefore, in the disaggregate approach the 
conditions are not gathered in one simple overall index, but viewed separately within several 
policy areas – as compliance may be higher in some policy areas than in others (Vreeland, 
2007). 
 
6.3.2 Researchers’ Investigations of Compliance 
There has not yet been done much research on compliance of IMF arrangements, and how to 
measure compliance is difficult, and not a straightforward task. Up until the 1990s there was 
                                                 
10
 Such as withholding/suspending loans – and in that way noncompliant countries may be coded as compliant. 
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not much information to base any studies, caused by the lack of transparency from the Fund. 
It is only the earliest researches on compliance that have used disaggregate approaches, all the 
recent work uses aggregate approaches, and a few results from known studies in literature will 
be presented next. 
Killick (1995)’s study is referred to by both Dreher (2003) and Vreeland (2007), and represent 
the first study to use the aggregate approach to measure compliance. In this study, programs 
were coded as uncompleted if at least 20 percent of the initial credit line remained undrawn at 
program expiration. Killick investigated 305 IMF arrangements from the period of 1979-93, 
and the study shows that only 47 percent of these were cases of compliance. In addition, the 
author claims that highly indebted countries, as well as countries with small amount of IMF 
credit are less likely to complete the programs. Dreher (2003) claim that non-compliance is 
quite common. He used an aggregate approach to study compliance in 104 countries during 
1975-98. He concludes that compliance with conditionality under IMF programs is 
traditionally quite low. Dreher emphasize further that “past compliance, low government 
consumption, a low share of short-term debt in GDP and high per capita GDP at the beginning 
of the programme period were found to be reliable indicators of future compliance” (2003, p. 
116). The study also concludes that interruptions of IMF arrangements are significantly more 
frequent in the more democratic countries, and especially prior to elections. 
Two examples where a disaggregate approach is used, is a study by Ivanova, Wolfgang, 
Mourmouras, and Anayiotos (2003), and one by the IMF (2001). Ivanova et al. analyzed the 
implementation of 170 arrangements approved between 1992 and 1998, and find that “about 
44 percent of all programs experienced an irreversible interruption, while 70 percent of all 
programs experienced either a major or minor interruption” (2003, p. 7). The IMF reports 
compliance in 57 percent of all arrangements between 1987 and 1999. They find the worst 
implementation for conditions related to privatization (45 percent) and the social security 
systems (57 percent). 
A few results regarding the effects of compliance are also worth mentioning. The issue 
regarding the effects of IMF arrangements on economic growth is discussed later in this 
thesis, but Dreher (2003) states a finding that is worth emphasizing here; that compliance 
seems to mitigate the negative effect he claims the IMF arrangements have on economic 
growth – but not enough to make a significant difference. Another study by Ilan Noy, cited by 
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Vreeland (2007), finds the same; that IMF program hurts growth even after controlling for 
compliance.  
How to measure compliance and the subsequent effects is a difficult and complicated task, 
and the different studies have limitations in form of focus areas and reliable results. Vreeland 
(2007) states that this is the reason why many researchers have avoided the issue of 
compliance in their studies. The question of compliance, how to measure it completely and 
the effects related to compliance is yet an area that needs more investigation. There are many 
criteria that have to be considered when measuring compliance. Recall the possible reasons 
for countries’ noncompliance cited by Dreher in the previous subsection, and the question of 
countries’ political relationship with the IMF are just some criteria that have to be taken into 
consideration. What has become clear from the different studies available, however, is that 
compliance is far from 100 percent, and that the rates differ across different policy areas. 
 
6.4 The Effects on Balance of Payments, Economic Growth and Inflation 
Following in this section, IMF’s intentions and results on the macroeconomic effects; balance 
of payments, economic growth, and inflation will be presented. The countries studied are 
mostly developing countries, which is understandable as the Fund’s activities have mainly 
been concentrated in underdeveloped and developing countries during the last decades. In 
each section the results of various studies will be emphasized, presented in groups of similar 
outcomes in order by the time period covered, and a table summarizing the most known 
studies in literature will conclude the findings. The far most studied topic is the effects of IMF 
arrangements on economic growth, and economic growth represents the topic with most 
diverged results. Many of the researchers mentioned have contributed to results on several or 
all of the mentioned macroeconomic effects, and a representable group of the studies will be 
presented in the following subsections. 
 
6.4.1 Balance of Payments 
If we look at the IMF’s Article of Agreement 1 (v) and (vi) from table 1, and recall their 
purposes, we see that one of the intentions of the IMF is to address balance of payments 
(BOP) problems. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with 
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opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting 
to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of 
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
IMF loans are intended to help countries that are taking in more imports or fixed assets or 
finance than they can balance out through their exports. The loans help countries dealing with 
their outstanding foreign debt so they can continue their necessary imports and services. The 
conditionality attached to the loans is intended to deal with the BOP problems so that the 
country can handle this balance without assistance in the future (Vreeland, 2007). 
 
The Effects of IMF Arrangements on Balance of Payments 
Many studies have addressed the IMF’s effects on balance of payments (BOP) through their 
lending arrangements. The results varies, from none effect on BOP, a positive effect, and a 
negative effect on BOP. There are studies covering the both the overall BOP and the current 
account
11
 component of the BOP, and some studies that only emphasize one of these two. 
The first two studies presented give no statistically significant results of any effect on the 
balance of payments in IMF-supported arrangements. The first was conducted by Reichmann 
and Stillson (1978), using a before-after approach, to study 79 stand-by arrangements (SBAs) 
during 1963-72
12
. The other study was conducted by Hutchison and Noy (2003), who used a 
general evaluation estimator (GEE) approach as they investigated 67 developing countries, 
covering the time period 1975-99. They emphasized short-term stabilization programs, stand-
by arrangements (SBAs) and extended fund facility arrangements (EFFs), and differentiated 
between IMF program participation in Latin America and elsewhere to be able to identify the 
uniqueness of the IMF’s intervention in Latin America. As mentioned earlier, Latin America 
represents the region with most IMF arrangements, and it is also the region most closely 
studied in literature. Both studies conclude with little or no improvement in the balance of 
payments. Hutchinson and Noy emphasize further that “Latin America has higher output costs 
of IMF programs (especially when ‘‘successfully’’ completed), […] and a much higher 
likelihood of program failure and recidivism than other regions of the world” (2003, p. 1011). 
                                                 
11
 «The current account of the balance of payments is the credits minus the debits of goods, services, income, and 
currents transfers» (Vreeland, 2007, p. 84). 
12
 The number of countries is not stated in this study, only the number of arrangements. 
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Manuel Pastor (1987) conducted a study on balance of payments measures, inflation rates, 
growth rates, dependency measures, and indicators of labor’s share of income in 18 Latin 
American countries covering the time period 1965-1981. The countries studied engaged in 
short-term stabilization programs, SBAs and EFFs. Pastor used a before-after approach to 
compare periods before and after IMF programs, along with Killick et al. (1990) who also 
conducted a before-after study in 17 Latin American countries during 1979-85. They both 
find a statistically significant positive effect on the balance of payments in the long run. Khan 
(1990) used a combination of a regression approach, the general evaluation estimator (GEE) 
method, a before-after approach, and a method controlling for nonrandom selection on 
observed variables to study the balance of payments, long-term growth performance, and 
inflation in 69 developing countries engaging in Fund-arrangements during the period 1973-
88. In all of the mentioned methodology approaches he finds the same positive statistically 
significant effect on the balance of payments. 
Some of the studies find that IMF arrangements have a positive effect on the current account 
of the BOP in particular. Researchers who have come to this conclusion includes Killick et al. 
(1990), Khan (1990) and Conway (1994); who conducted a study using a regression-based 
methodology approach on 74 developing countries during 1976-86. 
To mention a couple of studies with contradictive results, another before-after study by 
Evrensel (2002) and a with-without study by Garuda (2000) is emphasized. Garuda 
investigated 39 low-income countries, where Latin American countries are overrepresented, 
covering the time period 1975-91. The author used a propensity score estimation method, 
which is an with-without approach where the treatment and control groups used are countries 
that have approximately the same probability to agree to an IMF arrangement in terms of the 
countries pre-program economic/financial problems. The conclusion of the study is that 
countries participating in IMF arrangements show less significant improvements on the BOP 
than countries not participating. Garuda states that the study has limitations in forms of a 
limited sample size and that it does not cover a representable composition of countries, which 
raise doubts about the reliability of the findings. Evrensel investigated 191 developing 
countries during 1978-97, and the study includes all IMF lending arrangements. The results of 
this study show that the stabilization programs significantly improve the balance of payments 
and reserves during the program period, but that the improvements do not sustain in the post-
program period and are even reversed once the program is over. 
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Haque and Khan (1998) reviewed 16 studies, covering a time period from 1963 to 1993 where 
the research methods used are the before-after approach, the with-without approach, a 
regression-based / generalized evaluation method and comparison of simulations. Some of 
these studies only give results to the balance of payments, not the current account, and vice 
versa. The list of Haque and Khan’s review together with the results of other researchers are 
shown in table A4. Table 6.1 below shows a summary of the effects on the balance of 
payments related to the methodology approach used in the studies. 
 
Table 6.1: Researchers’ Results of the Effects on Balance of Payments 
Methodology 
Approach 
Number 
of Studies 
Results on Balance of Payments 
  No Effect Positive Effect Negative Effect 
  BOP Current 
Account 
BOP Current 
Account 
BOP Current 
Account 
Before-after 
 
With-without 
 
Regression-based  
/ Generalized 
Equation 
 
Simulations 
8 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
2 
3 
 
1 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
4 
 
1 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
3 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
2 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
3 
 
2 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
0 
Total 19 4 5 10 7 3 2 
 
The overall mutual consensus is that IMF arrangements do have a positive effect on the 
balance of payments. Most studies come to this conclusion, supported by a variety 
methodology approaches and data sets. Even though there are some studies that come to the 
conclusion of a negative outcome, as emphasized by Vreeland (2007); there are no cited study 
in available literature that finds a statistically significant negative effect on the balance of 
payments. This implies that the IMF does obey their first article of agreement and help 
member countries correct maladjustments in their balance of payments.  
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6.4.2 Economic Growth 
Economic growth is an indicator widely used to control for IMF outcomes. The development 
and prosperity of economic growth addresses many of the other issues regarding economic 
difficulties in a country. A country with a steady economic growth can handle some 
difficulties in the BOP and can afford to maintain some degree of inflation (Vreeland, 2007).  
From a joint statement from the IMF and the World Bank in 2000, they announce that “the 
purpose of our institutions is to help all our member countries develop their human potential 
and productive resources, thereby building the foundations for sustainable economic growth” 
(IMF & Bank, 2000). In addition, Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) highlight several 
speeches from the former IMF Managing Director, Michael Camdessus (1994, 2000) who 
states “that the IMF’s primary goal is not only growth but also ‘high quality growth’’’ (p. 
372). This shows that the intention from the IMF is so their arrangements should help member 
countries to obtain and maintain a sustainable, high quality economic growth. Economic 
growth is the far most studied topic when referring to the effects of IMF lending 
arrangements, and there are a multiple number of published studies available. 
 
The Effects of IMF Arrangements on Economic Growth 
There has been done a lot of research on the effects of IMF arrangements on economic 
growth, and the results varies from; none effect on economic growth, an increase in economic 
growth, decrease in economic growth, and decrease in the short run and increase in the long 
run. A lot of the published studies claim to have statistically significant results, whereby the 
results diverge in different directions. 
The first two studies presented give results of none effect on economic growth. The first is 
Pastor’s (1987) before-after study in 18 Latin American countries, covering the period 1965-
81. The second study is conducted by Atoyan and Conway (2006), who used a combination of 
the with-without and instrumental-variable methodology approach to study 95 developing 
countries during 1993-2002. Atoyan and Conway include all types of different IMF lending 
arrangements and find “little statistical support that IMF programs contemporaneously 
improve real economic growth in participating countries, but stronger evidence of an 
improvement in economic growth in years following a program” (2006, p. 99). 
A few studies showing a positive result on economic growth are conducted by Dicks-
Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000), Killick et al. (1990), and Conway (1994). Dicks-
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Mireaux et al. (2000) conducted a study of 74 low-income countries engaging in enhanced 
structural adjustment facility (ESAF)
13
 arrangements during 1986-91, and find statistically 
significant results on an increase in economic growth. However, the authors find that many of 
the assumptions in their study are doubtful, which cause them to raise doubts about the 
reliability of the findings. Both Killick et al. (1990)’s before-after study during 1975-85 and 
Conway (1994)’s regression-based study on 74 developing countries, based on SBAs and 
EFFs, during 1976-86 find a negative short-run effect on growth and a longer-term 
improvement after three and two years. 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000)’s study was also based on a regression-based approach, and 
the authors investigated 135 countries during 1970-90. They did not consider which lending 
arrangement the countries were under, but in their sample of 725 arrangements – 88 percent 
were SBAs. The results of their study are as follows; “Our results indicate that countries that 
do not enter into IMF programs grow faster than those that do even when both groups face 
high domestic deficits or foreign reserves crises” (2000, p. 403). They come to the final 
conclusion that countries participating in IMF arrangements are worse off than countries that 
do not participate. Another regression-based study presented were conducted by Butkiewicz 
and Yanikkaya (2005), who investigated the long-term growth rates of 100 developing 
countries during 1970-99. This study gives results of a significant negative growth effect of 
IMF lending, on both public and private investments. The authors emphasize further that IMF 
policy conditions require reductions in public expenditures, and the first cut is usually in 
public investments – which have negative effects on overall investments and growth in a 
country. They also mention that the larger the Fund supported loans, the larger the economic 
problems of the participating countries. 
One of the more recent studies by Hutchison and Noy (2003) in 67 developing countries, with 
emphasis on Latin America during 1975-99, come to the conclusion that IMF arrangements 
have a negative effect on growth rates, and that the evidence is even worse for Latin 
American countries. They use a variety of different methodology approaches, and show that 
the effect is even worse for successfully completed programs. Barro and Lee (2005), who 
conducted a study using an instrumental variable approach to investigate 130 countries during 
1975-2000, also come to the conclusion of a negative effect on economic growth, but 
                                                 
13
 The ESAF was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in November 1999 (IMF, 
2013a). 
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emphasize further that the negative effect seems to involve in fact, rather than the amount, of 
IMF lending. 
Dreher (2006) and Haque and Khan (1998) each list a summary of multiple studies on 
economic growth, counting 32 studies in a time period from 1963 to 2002 where the research 
methods used are the before-after approach, the with-without approach, a regression-based / 
GEE approach, and a simulation approach. Table A5 presents their summary, and table 6.2 
below shows the results according to the methodology approaches used. Note that the 
instrumental-variable approach in this summary are listed under the regression-based 
approach, and that the study of Atoyan and Conway (2006) is listed twice. 
 
Table 6.2: Researchers’ Results of the Effects on Economic Growth 
Methodology 
Approach 
Number of 
Studies 
Results on economic growth 
  No effect Increase Decrease 
Before-after 9 6 3 0 
With-without 8 6 1 1 
Regression-based / 
Generalized equation 
 
14 
 
5 
 
3 
 
6 
Simulations 2 0 1 1 
Total 33 17 8 8 
 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) think there is a limitation in the short period of 
observations used in most studies published on the topic, where the likelihood of the reported 
results reflect business cycle effects rather than the growth effects of the IMF arrangements or 
some combination of these two. They also think that the conflicting result on the effect on 
economic growth may arise from differences in the types of IMF programs that are 
investigated – in terms of differences in groups of countries, methodology approaches, and 
controlling for other determinants of economic growth. Atoyan and Conway (2006) highlight 
three reasons why the results vary in such a big scale, which is much of the same critique 
presented by Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya. Different time periods covered for the studies is the 
first reason, where IMF arrangements in the 1970s may have been quite different in 
economic-growth impact than programs in the 1990s. The aspect of which type of lending 
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arrangements covered is the second reason, where there are large differences between the 
different arrangements. The third reason is the different research techniques and methodology 
approaches used in order to collect and analyze the data of the study. 
The results of the different published studies are mixed. There has not been a clear consensus 
among the researchers on the effects on economic growth, but Vreeland (2007) claims that 
that the newly emerging consensus is that IMF arrangements hurt economic growth. The most 
recent studies, which show statistically significant results of negative effects on economic 
growth, use more sophisticated and advanced methodology approaches. This can be closer 
investigated in the summary of results shown in table A5 in the appendix. 
 
6.4.3 Inflation 
In the early years of the IMF, inflation targets were first implemented by a number of 
industrialized countries, and the Fund’s involvement was restricted to a surveillance function. 
In the recent decades, however, after “a number of emerging market economies have 
abandoned their fixed exchange rate regimes and moved toward a flexible exchange rate 
system with an explicit inflation targeting framework for monetary policy” (Blejer, Leone, 
Rabanal, & Schwartz, 2001, p. 3) there had become a need for a inflation targeting framework 
within the conditionality of the IMF. There are some difficulties related to how to include 
inflation targeting frameworks in the policy conditions, however, because the implementation 
is largely based on the premise that an independent central bank can use “at its own 
discretion, its various policy instruments, in the proportions considered appropriate in each 
particular circumstance, so as to ensure the attainment of its inflation goal” (Blejer et al., 
2001, p. 3). As concluded earlier, the conditionality focuses on addressing balance of 
payments problems, and the inflation targeting by the Fund is, in principal, accommodated 
within the traditional structure of monetary conditionality, given that the primarily focus is on 
a country’s BOP objective (Blejer et al., 2001). To conclude, the IMF is not operating with a 
tight control over inflation, but as emphasized by Pastor (1987, p. 257); “the Fund generally 
argues that its programs tend to reduce the rate of inflation or at least the rate at which it 
increases”. 
The Effects of IMF Arrangements on Inflation 
Most of the studies contributing to the effects on inflation have been mentioned in the last two 
subsections, and in the case of these studies only the results will be presented. Most of the 
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known studies in literature show a decrease in the inflation rate, and only one study currently 
available for this study shows the result of an increase, which is the study of Goldstein and 
Montiel (1986), cited in Haque and Khan (1998)’s study. 
Easterly (2006) investigated 107 developing countries in the time period from 1980-99, and 
the results of the study show no statistically effect on inflation. This conclusion is in 
agreement with the results of Pastor (1987), Evrensel (2002), and Barro and Lee (2005), who 
also found no statistically effects of IMF arrangements on inflation. Researchers who find a 
negative effect on inflation in their studies include Killick et al. (1990), Khan (1990), Conway 
(1994), and Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000). 
As with the results on BOP and economic growth, Haque and Khan (1998) also reviewed the 
effects of inflation, and their summary of 17 studies together with the results from other 
researchers are shown in table A6. Table 6.3 below shows the results according to the 
methodology approaches used. 
 
Table 6.3: Researchers’ Results of the Effects on Inflation 
Methodology 
Approach 
Number of 
Studies 
Results on Inflation 
  No effect Increase Decrease 
Before-after 8 5 0 3 
With-without 3 0 0 3 
Regression-based  / 
Generalized Equation 
7 2 1 4 
Simulations 2 0 0 2 
Total 19 4 1 12 
 
Even though it seems like the overall consensus is that IMF arrangements cause a negative 
effect on inflation, many of the studies listed that have come to the conclusion of a significant 
negative effect are older and use earlier with-without and before-after methodology 
approaches, as emphasized by Vreeland (2007). If we study table A6 in the appendix, we see 
that the studies of a more recent date show no significant effect regarding inflation. The newer 
studies use more sophisticated methodology approaches which control for nonrandom 
selection in a more reliable way; and hence give more reliable results. 
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6.5 Moral Hazard 
As we recall; moral hazard describes a scenario when a party may be more willing to take 
greater risks, knowing that the cost and burdens will be borne by another party, which may 
lead to imprudent actions. In terms of IMF lending; the creditor-side of moral hazard implies 
a greater willingness to lend, while the debtor-side implies that member countries may not 
undertake the realistic risks of borrowing – both sides with the believes that the IMF will bail 
out countries in event of trouble. The possibility to be bailed out by the Fund may reduce the 
motivations of both borrowers and lenders to take preventive actions, and the presence of the 
Fund may be compared to an insurance in order to be able to act in an imprudent way. But, as 
pointed out by Lee and Shin (2008, p. 818) “Unlike insurance contracts, IMF lending helps to 
mitigate the ‘‘real hazard’’ of a crisis. […] When IMF lending decrease real hazard and 
simultaneously increase moral hazard, the separation between the two effects becomes a 
critical issue. For example, the presence of IMF financial support can increase international 
lending to borrowers through a decrease in real hazard of a crisis or an increase in moral 
hazard, or both”. 
The IMF has implemented policy conditions (conditionality) in their lending arrangements, 
among other reasons to deal with the possibility of moral hazard. “IMF conditionality was not 
designed to minimize moral hazard with respect to third parties,[however,] such as other 
countries, private creditors, or, in borrowing countries with less-than-benevolent 
governments, the citizens of those countries” (Jeanne, Ostry, & Zettelmeyer, 2008, p. 6). 
The debate concerning moral hazard and the IMF emerged after the massive Mexican bailout 
in 1995, and the increased frequency and size of IMF lending the last few decades. This 
increased intervention by the Fund may signal a significant distortion of incentives to 
investors, which may cause creditor moral hazard (Lee & Shin, 2008).  The aim of this section 
is to investigate and interpret the results of different studies available. Different methodology 
approaches and researcher’s results will be presented in the following subsection in order to 
investigate if the IMF contributes to moral hazard through their lending arrangements. 
Approaches to Measure Moral Hazard 
It is hard to measure the existence of moral hazard related to IMF intervention directly and 
precisely. As of the case with measuring compliance and the macroeconomic effects of IMF 
arrangements, there are several approaches used to investigate the possible existence of moral 
hazard. There are also large differences and conflicts among researchers on how to measure 
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the concept. The approaches for testing the moral hazard effects used in the variety of studies 
are quite complicated and comprehensive, and discussing the structure of these approaches is 
irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis. Therefore a simpler overview, based on Dreher 
(2004)’s study – which includes a multiple of studies, will be used in order to explain how the 
different result have emerged. Note that since the different approaches diverge in such an 
extent there is difficult to give a precisely overview. The available studies in literature 
differentiate between the creditor-side and debtor-side of moral hazard. 
 
Table 6.4: Indices for Analyzing Creditor Moral Hazard. Source: (Dreher, 2004) 
Analyzing the behavior 
of/evidence from bond 
spreads: 
 
 Do bond spreads decrease? 
 Are more or longer-term funds flowing to emerging 
markets? 
 Do countries where bailouts are more likely receive 
more or cheaper capital? 
 Do bond spreads respond less to changes in 
fundamentals? 
 Is the dispersion of spreads reduced for given 
creditworthiness? (p.4) 
The effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on bond 
spreads before and after the crisis is emphasized by 
several researchers. 
Testing for the impact of the 
IMF on stock markets. 
“The announcement of an IMF rescue package [may 
increase] increases stock prices of banks in countries 
receiving the bailout, but not in other countries” (p. 17) 
Analyzing the maturity 
structure of  loans 
As emphasized by Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2002, p. 9);  
“If expectations of an IMF bailout reduce investors’ risk 
perceptions and generate an increase in the maturity of 
international loans, then such reactions could reasonably be 
used as a measure for the existence of moral hazard”. 
Analyzing the likelihood to 
receive IMF loans 
Recall the question of countries’ political relationship with 
the IMF and the US. 
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The indices mainly used by the overall studies in literature to investigate the existence of 
creditor moral hazard, drawn by the study of Dreher, are summarized in table 6.4 above. The 
main indicator is the behavior of bond spreads, and the different approaches on how to 
analyze the evidence of data are also very extensive. The existence of debtor moral hazard has 
only been investigated by a small number of studies so far, and some of the focus areas in the 
available studies, drawn from Dreher’s study, are shown in table 6.5 below. 
 
Table 6.5: Focus Areas for Analyzing Debtor Moral Hazard 
Source: (Dreher, 2004) 
Focusing on “inter-program-periods” “If IMF programs would induce moral 
hazard with the borrower, one would expect 
macroeconomic policies to worsen in inter-
program-periods because otherwise the 
country could not negotiate additional 
programs” (p. 18). 
Analyzing the degree of borrowing against 
the country's quota with the IMF, and  the 
amount of credit available 
“As the country’s quota is increasingly 
exhausted and, by implication, the quantity 
of additional credit available from the IMF 
diminishes, the incentive to pursue excessive 
policy declines” (p. 19) 
Controlling for the rate of real GDP growth 
and the inflation rate 
The hypothesis that “budget deficits indeed 
rise with IMF money received, also gives 
support to the hypothesis of moral hazard in 
the wider sense” (p. 19). 
Analyzing the likelihood to receive IMF 
loans 
Recall the question of countries’ political 
relationship with the IMF and the US. 
Macroeconomic policies “The possibility that the governments of 
program countries may adopt unsustainable 
macroeconomic policies due to the 
availability of Fund credit” (Evrensel, 2002, 
p. 584) 
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6.5.1 Evidence of Moral Hazard 
Due to the variety of different methodology approaches that are used to draw conclusions, 
only a few examples of studies targeting IMF’s causation of moral hazard will be mentioned 
in this subsection. Table 6.6 will conclude the findings, summarizing the most known studies 
in literature. 
Noy (2008, p. 65) cites that creditor-side moral hazard, could lead to the following - which 
may also describe some of the outcomes for debtor-side moral hazard: “(1) an increase in the 
amount lent; (2) a decrease in the price of loans, so that it no longer reflects insurance-free 
risk; (3) a change in the composition of investment away from uninsured investment (e.g., 
equity) to insured flows  (e.g., sovereign bonds); and (4) a change in the composition of 
international portfolios away from less risky but less profitable investment opportunities to 
more risky but more profitable ones if outcomes are positive”. 
 
Creditor Moral Hazard 
First, the studies focusing on the creditor-side of moral hazard will be emphasized, and one 
example is the study of Noy (2008), who investigated the empirical evidence of creditor moral 
hazard by testing available data of large international post-crisis bailouts. The author used 
event-study methodology in addition to examine other possible explanations that might 
account for the effects. The study used indices of emerging market spreads for secondary-
market sovereign bonds over US treasury bills, and analyzed these data on a monthly basis in 
the countries Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela between 1994 and 2002. 
The conclusion of the study show weak or no evidence of moral hazard in the IMF 
arrangements studied. 
One creditor-side study that shows evidence of moral hazard was conducted by Mina and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2002), who investigated 71 emerging and developing countries for the 
period 1992-97. They investigated if lender’s perceptions about risk improved by analyzing 
the maturity structure of Fund-supported loans. They find that IMF arrangements tend to 
reduce short-term debt flows relative to total debt flows, and therefore generate creditor moral 
hazard. 
  
- 59 - 
 
Debtor Moral Hazard 
All of the studies on debtor moral hazard found for this thesis conclude with finding evidence 
of debtor moral hazard contributed by IMF lending arrangements. One of these studies was 
conducted by Evrensel (2002), who also contributed to results of the effects on BOP, 
economic growth, and inflation. The author investigated 42 countries between 1971 and 1997, 
by checking for macroeconomic fundamentals before, after and in inter-program periods. 
Evrensel states that “Fund-supported programs implies the possibility that the governments of 
program countries may adopt unsustainable macroeconomic policies due to the availability of 
Fund credit” (2002, p. 584). The study concludes that by “considering the revolving nature of 
the Fund support, this result is inconsistent with the effectiveness of stabilization programs 
and may be interpreted as a signal of moral hazard” (2002, p. 586). 
 
Table 6.6: Researchers’ Evidence of Moral Hazard 
Focus area of study Number of 
studies 
Results of evidence of moral hazard 
  Debtor-side Creditor-side 
  Evidence No 
evidence 
Evidence No 
evidence 
Bond spreads 11   7 4 
Stock returns 3   3 0 
Maturity structure of 
loans 
2   2 0 
Macroeconomic 
policy 
3 3 0   
Probability of IMF 
programs 
1 1 0   
Budget deficit and 
monetary expansion 
1 1 0   
Total 21 5 0 12 4 
 
 
- 60 - 
 
In his comprehensive study, Dreher (2004) investigated 20 studies of moral hazard. 16 of 
these studied investigated the creditor-side evidence of moral hazard, while only 4 the debtor-
side. The study by Corsetti, Guimarães, and Roubini (2006) can be added to the list of debtor-
side studies, which now counts five studies. Table A7 show the complete list of these studies, 
while table 6.6 above show the result according to the focus area the results are drawn upon. 
The results of the different studies show a clear picture that IMF arrangements do cause moral 
hazard. How to interpret the results, however, is a difficult task. The variety of different 
methodology approaches, and the degree of variety among the different data that are used to 
draw the results makes it hard to draw any final conclusions. There are definitely 
shortcomings among the available studies on moral hazard, and one interesting feature 
pointed out by Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2002) is that none of their cited studies explicitly 
takes into account the level of IMF lending. What is the most statistically challenging task 
regarding the investigation of moral hazard is to be able to isolate the impact of the IMF from 
other factors that might that might affect the results (Bird, 2007). As pointed out by Conway 
and Fischer (2006), the results from many of the debtor-side studies are equally likely to 
reflect the effect of conditionality than evidence of moral hazard. 
 
 
  
- 61 - 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The International Monetary Fund is acting as an international lender of last resort, and their 
intervention is quite extensive on a world basis. Up until recent years, their lending 
arrangements have mainly been implemented in developing countries, but once again the 
industrialized world is turning to the Fund for assistance. 
Through their lending arrangements, the IMF does have the intentions of addressing balance 
of payments problems, and to obtain and maintain a sustainable, high quality economic 
growth among their member countries. The Fund is not operating with a tight control over 
inflation, however, but the need for a closer focus on inflation is emphasized by several 
researchers. The results emerging from different studies are that IMF lending arrangements do 
seem to have a positive impact on balance of payments, but do cause a negative effect on 
economic growth. At the same time, the lending arrangements do not seem to cause any 
statistically significant effects regarding inflation for the recipient countries. Newer and more 
comprehensive methodology approaches have led to some degree of consensus among 
researchers on the studied macroeconomic outcomes and effects. One major concern 
regarding the macroeconomic effects of IMF arrangements, however, is that the degree of 
compliance with the policy conditions may have an impact on the actual results. The lack of 
studies on compliance and the lack of consensus on how to measure compliance creates some 
degree of uncertainty regarding the results of the macroeconomic effects, and more research 
are needed in order to conclude with more reliable results. 
The reason why the discussions of whether or not the IMF contributes to moral hazard 
through their lending arrangements are so heated is quite clear. How to measure the concept, 
however, is far from clear. The existing research seems to give an overview that the lending 
arrangements of the Fund do create both debtor-side and creditor-side moral hazard, but the 
lack of consensus on how to measure the concept, the variance of different methodology 
approaches used to draw the conclusions, and the overall extent of data used in the available 
studies makes it impossible to draw any final conclusions at this stage. More research is 
crucially needed in order to conclude whether there exists evidence of moral hazard or not. 
The focus areas of the majority of studies in literature have been emerging and developing 
countries, and the lending arrangements most investigated have been short-term stabilization 
programs, mainly stand-by arrangements and extended fund facility arrangements. There 
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seems to be an overall consensus that the existing studies on how the IMF affect member 
countries through their lending arrangements show limitations in the short period of 
observations used, and in the types of IMF programs and countries that are investigated.  
Many studies currently available in literature should be labeled outdated, due to that the 
results are drawn from older and outdated methodology approaches, and due to that the actual 
work of the Fund most certainly has changed during their lifetime. One should not draw any 
comprehensive conclusions on that the effects caused by the Fund in during 1960s and 1970s 
should reflect how their arrangements affect the member countries today. Every organization 
has its learning curve, and one should always assume that everyone strive to continuously 
improve their actions. What is worth emphasizing, and what is yet a difficult task to embrace, 
is the distinction of which effects are due of IMF intervention and which are due to those 
events that would have otherwise occurred. We have to remember that member countries turn 
to the IMF in times of crises, and it is a difficult task to get a country “back on track” after it 
has experienced periods of distress. The fact that the IMF once again is resurrected in the 
industrialized world opens up for new areas of research and discussions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: The Original Members of the IMF Source: (Vreeland, 2007, p. 6) 
(Reported in the Summary Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting on the Board of 
Governors, September 27 to October 3, 1946) 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Czechoslovakia 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
France 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Iceland 
India 
Iran 
Iraq 
Luxembourg 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippine Commonwealth 
Poland 
Union of South Africa 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
Uruguay 
Yugoslavia 
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Table A2: Number of ongoing IMF Arrangements
14
. Source: (IMF, 2000, 2006, 2013g) 
  (Amounts committed under arrangements – in millions of SDRs) 
Year SBA EFF FCL PCL/PLL SAF PRGT Total 
1953 2 
(55) 
- - - - - 2 
(55) 
1960 12 
(351) 
- - - - - 12 
(351) 
1965 24 
(2,159) 
- - - - - 24 
(2,159) 
1970 23 
(2,381) 
- - - - - 23 
(2,381) 
1975 12 
(337) 
- - - - - 12 
(337) 
1980 22 
(2,340) 
7 
(1,463) 
- - - - 29 
(3,803) 
1985 27 
(3,925) 
3 
(7,750) 
- - - - 30 
(11,675) 
1990 19 
(3,597) 
4 
(7,834) 
- - 17 
(1,110) 
11 
(1,370) 
51 
(13,911) 
1995 19 
(13,190) 
9 
(6,840) 
- - 1 
(49) 
27 
(3,306) 
56 
(23,385) 
2000 16 
(45,606) 
11 
(9,798) 
- - - 31 
(3,516) 
58 
(58,920) 
2001 17 
(34,906) 
8 
(8,697) 
- - - 37 
(3,298) 
62 
(46,901) 
2002 13 
(44,095) 
4 
(7,643) 
- - - 35 
(4,201) 
52 
(55,939) 
2003 15 
(42,807) 
3 
(4,432) 
- - - 36 
(4,450) 
54 
(51,689) 
2004 11 
(53,994) 
2 
(794) 
- - - 36 
(4,356) 
49 
(59,094) 
2005 10 
(11,992) 
2 
(794) 
- - - 31 
(2,878) 
43 
(15,664) 
2006 10 
(9,534) 
1 
(9) 
- - - 27 
(1,770) 
38 
(11,313) 
2007 6 
(7,864) 
1 
(9) 
- - - 29 
(1,664) 
36 
(9,537) 
2008 7 
(7,507) 
2 
(351) 
- - - 25 
(1,089) 
34 
(8,948) 
2009 15 
(34,326) 
- 1 
(31,528) 
- - 28 
(1,813) 
44 
(67,668) 
2010 21 
(56,776) 
2 
(205) 
3 
(52,184) 
- - 30 
(3,245) 
56 
(112,410) 
2011 18 
(59,052) 
4 
(19,804) 
3 
(68,780) 
1 
(413) 
- 31 
(3,345) 
57 
(151,394) 
2012 13 
(20,806) 
6 
(67,331) 
3 
(70,328) 
1 
(413) 
- 28 
(3,911) 
51 
(162,789) 
2013 7 
(5,130) 
5 
(67,152) 
3 
(73,162) 
1 
(4,117) 
- 25 
(2,929) 
41 
(152,490) 
 
                                                 
14
 From 1953 up till 2000 only a five year interval of arrangements is shown in the table. 
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Table A3: Countries that have never participated in a conditioned IMF arrangement 
(1945-2005). Source: (Vreeland, 2007, p. 28 Table 1.1) 
Africa 
Country 
 
IMF membership 
Asia 
Country 
 
IMF membership 
Angola 
Botswana 
Eritrea 
Libya 
Namibia 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
1989- 
1968- 
1994- 
1958- 
1990- 
1977- 
1969- 
Bhutan 
Brunei 
North Korea 
Malaysia 
Maldive Islands 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
1981- 
1995- 
- 
1958- 
1978- 
1966- 
1949-1980 
The Americas 
Country 
 
IMF membership 
Europe 
Countries 
 
IMF membership 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Canada 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent 
Suriname 
1982- 
1973- 
1945- 
1984- 
1979- 
1979- 
1978- 
Andorra 
Austria 
Denmark 
East Germany* 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Norway 
San Marino 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
USSR** 
- 
1948- 
1946- 
- 
1952- 
1945- 
1957- 
- 
1945- 
1968- 
1945- 
1992- 
1992- 
1951- 
1992- 
- 
Middle East 
Country 
 
IMF membership 
Pacific Islands 
Country 
 
IMF membership 
Bahrain 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkmenistan 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemen PDR (South)* 
Yemen Arab Rep.* 
1972- 
1945- 
1962- 
1947- 
1971- 
1972- 
1957- 
1992- 
1972- 
1969-1990 
1970-1990 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia 
Nauru 
Palau 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
 
1986- 
1992- 
1993- 
- 
1997- 
1985- 
1981- 
Notes: * Country ceased to exist as an independent state in 1990. 
** Country ceased to exist in 1991. 
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Table A4: Researchers’ Results of the Effects on Balance of Payments15 
Source: (Haque & Khan, 1998, p. 13 Table 1) in addition to own summary 
Study Time 
period 
Number of 
programs 
Number of 
countries 
Effects on 
    BOP Current 
Account 
Before-after      
Reichmann and Stillson 
(1978) 
1963-72 79 … None 
 
.. 
Connors (1979) 1973-77 31 23 None None 
Killick (1984) 1974-79 38 24 None None 
Zulu and Nsouli (1985) 1980-81 35 22 .. None 
Pastor (1987) 1965-81 … 18 Positive* None 
Killick et al. (1990) 1979-85 … 16 Positive* Positive* 
Schadler et al. (1993) 1983-93 55 19 Positive Negative 
Evrensel (2002) 1971-97 n.a. 109 Negative … 
 
With-without      
Donovan (1982) 1971-80 78 44 Positive Positive 
Loxley (1984) 1971-82 38 38 None None 
Gylfason (1987) 1977-79 32 14 Positive* .. 
Garuda (2000) 1975-91 58 39 Negative  
 
Regresion-based / 
Generalized 
Evaluation 
     
Goldstein and Montiel 
(1986) 
1974-81 68 58 Negative Negative 
Khan (1990) 1973-88 259 69 Positive* Positive* 
Conway (1994) 1976-86 217 74 .. Negative, 
Positive* 
Bagci and Perraudin 
(1997) 
1973-92 … 68 Positive* Positive* 
Hutchison and Noy 
(2003) 
1975–97 764 67 Positive … 
 
Simulation      
Khan and Knight 
(1981) 
1968-75 … 29 Positive Positive 
Khan and Knight 
(1985) 
1968-75 … 29 Positive Positive 
(*) Indicates statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Some of the numbers and years in the summary are adjusted according to the original source. 
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Table A5: Researchers’ Results of the Effects on Economic Growth16 
Source: (Dreher, 2006, p. 773 Table 2; Haque & Khan, 1998, p. 13 Table 1) 
                                                 
16
 Some of the numbers and years in the summary are adjusted according to the original source. 
Study Period Number of 
programs 
Number of 
countries 
Effects of 
growth 
Before-after:     
Reichman and 
Stillson (1978) 
1963-72 79 n.a. Increase 
Connors (1979) 1973-77 31 23 None 
Zulu et al. 
(1985) 
1980-81 35 22 None 
Killick (1986) 1974-79 38 24 None 
Pastor (1987) 1965-81 n.a. 18 None 
Killick et al. 
(1990) 
1979-85 n.a. 16 Decrease, 
Increase* 
Schadler et al. 
(1993) 
1983-93 55 19 Increase 
Evrensel (2002) 1971-97 n.a. 109 None 
Hardoy (2003) 1970-90 460 69 None 
 
With–without:     
Donovan (1981) 1970-76 12 12 Increase 
Donovan (1982) 1971-80 78 44 Decrease 
Loxley (1984) 1971–82 38 38 None 
Gylfason (1987) 1977–79 32 14 None 
Faini et al. 
(1991) 
1978–86 n.a. 93 None 
Hardoy (2003) 1970–90 460 69 None 
Hutchison 
(2003) 
1975–97 455 25 None 
Atoyan and 
Conway (2006) 
1993–2002 181 95 None 
 
Regression-
based: 
    
Goldstein and 
Montiel (1986) 
1974–81 68 58 None 
Khan (1990) 1973–88 259 69 Decrease* 
Doroodian 
(1993) 
1977–83 27 43 None 
Conway (1994) 1976–86 217 74 Decrease, 
Increase* 
Bagci and 
Perraudin 
(1997) 
1973–92 n.a. 68 Increase* 
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Bordo and 
Schwartz (2000) 
1973–98 n.a. 24 Decrease 
Dicks-Mireaux 
et al. (2000) 
1986–91 88 74 Increase* 
Przeworski and 
Vreeland (2000) 
1970–90 465 135 Decrease 
Hutchison and 
Noy (2003) 
1975–97 764 67 Decrease 
Nsouli et al. 
(2005) 
1992–2000 124 92 None 
Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya 
(2005) 
1970–99 407 100 Decrease 
Easterly (2005) 1980–99 107 107 None 
Atoyan and 
Conway (2005) 
1993–2002 181 95 None 
Barro and Lee 
(2005) 
1975–2000 613 130 Decrease 
 
Simulations:     
Khan and 
Knight (1981) 
1968-75 n.a. 29 Decrease 
Khan and 
Knight (1985) 
1968-75 n.a. 29 Decrease, 
increase* 
(*) Indicates statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table A6: Researchers’ Results of the Effects on Inflation17 
Source: (Haque & Khan, 1998, p. 13 Table 1) in addition to own summary 
Study Time 
period 
Number 
of 
programs 
Number of 
countries 
Effects on 
inflation 
Before-after     
Reichmann and Stillson (1978) 1963-72 79 … None 
 
Connors (1979) 1973-77 31 23 None 
Killick (1984) 1974-79 38 24 Decrease* 
Zulu and Nsouli (1985) 1980-81 35 22 None 
Pastor (1987) 1965-81 … 18 None 
Killick et al. (1990) 1979-85 … 16 Decrease* 
Schadler et al. (1993) 1983-93 55 19 Decrease 
Evrensel (2002) 1971-97 n.a. 109 None 
 
With-without     
Donovan (1981) 1970-76 12 12 Decrease 
Donovan (1982) 1971-80 78 44 Decrease 
Loxley (1984) 1971-82 38 38 Decrease* 
 
Regresion-based / Generalized 
Evaluation 
    
Goldstein and Montiel (1986) 1974-81 68 58 Increase 
Khan (1990) 1973-88 259 69 Decrease 
Conway (1994) 1976-86 217 74 Decrease 
Bagci and Perraudin (1997) 1973-92 … 68 Decrease 
Dicks-Mireaux,et al. (1997) 1986-91 88 74 Decrease 
Easterly (2005) 1980–99 107 107 None 
Barro and Lee (2005) 1975–2000 613 130 None 
 
Simulation     
Khan and Knight (1981) 1968-75 … 29 Decrease 
Khan and Knight (1985) 1968-75 … 29 Decrease 
(*) Indicates statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
 
 
  
                                                 
17
 Some of the numbers and years in the summary are adjusted according to the original source. 
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Table A7: Researchers’ Evidence of Moral Hazard 
Source: (Dreher, 2004, p. 26 Table 1) 
Study  Period Sample Focus Result* 
Zhang (1999) 
(creditor) 
1/1992-2/1997, 
quarterly  
6 Eurobonds, 4 
Brady bonds  
Bond spreads  No evidence of 
moral hazard  
Eichengreen and 
Mody (2000) 
(creditor)  
1/1991-4/1999, 
quarterly  
Bondware  Bond spreads Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Lane and Phillips 
(2000) (creditor) 
1995-1999, 
daily  
EMBI plus  Bond spreads  No evidence of 
moral hazard, 
except for 
Russian non-
bailout  
McBrady and 
Seasholes (2000) 
(creditor)  
2/24/1999-
2/26/1999, 
daily  
402 Bonds  Bond spreads  Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Tillmann (2001)  
(creditor) 
1/1/1994-
11/2/2000, 
daily  
EMBI plus  Bond spreads  No evidence of 
moral hazard  
Dell’Ariccia, 
Schnabel and 
Zettelmeyer 
(2002) (creditor) 
1998-2000, 
daily  
EMBI Global 
(21 countries) 
and Bondware 
(54 countries)  
Bond spreads  Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Evrensel (2002) 
(debtor) 
1971-97, 
yearly  
42 countries Macroeconomic 
Policy  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Mina and 
Martinez-
Vasquez (2002) 
(creditor) 
1992-97, 
yearly  
71 countries  Maturity 
structure of 
loans  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Mina and 
Martinez-
Vasquez (2003) 
(creditor) 
1992-97, 
yearly  
6 MENA 
countries  
Maturity 
structure of 
loans  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Haldane and 
Scheibe (2003) 
(creditor)  
1995-2002, 
daily  
7 UK banks  Stock returns of 
creditor banks  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Gai and Taylor 
(2004) (debtor) 
1/1995-4/2001, 
quarterly  
19 countries  Probability of 
IMF programs  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Kamin (2004) 
(creditor) 
3/1992-
11/2001, 
monthly  
EMBI  Bond spreads, 
capital flows  
Consistent with 
moral hazard 
between 1995-
1998 but not 
thereafter  
Dreher and 
Vaubel (2004) 
(debtor) 
1975-97, 
yearly  
94 countries  Budget deficit 
and monetary 
expansion  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Evrensel and 
Kutan (2004a) 
(creditor) 
12/19/1996-
2/27/2003 and 
5/17/1996-
Indonesia and 
Korea  
Bond spreads  Consistent with 
moral hazard  
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2/27/2003, 
daily  
Evrensel and 
Kutan (2004c) 
(creditor)  
6/1/1992-
12/27/2002, 
daily  
Indonesia and 
Korea  
Stock returns  Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Evrensel and 
Kutan (2004d) 
(creditor) 
6/1/1992-
12/27/2002, 
daily  
Indonesia, 
Korea and 
Thailand  
Stock returns in 
the financial 
sector  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Lee and Shin 
(2004) (creditor) 
1/1998-
12/2000, 
monthly  
EMBI Global 
(16 countries)  
Bond spreads  Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Evrensel and 
Kim (2004) 
(debtor)  
1967-96, 
yearly  
91 countries  Macroeconomic 
Policy  
Consistent with 
moral hazard  
Zoli (2004) 
(creditor) 
1993-2000, 
quarterly  
32 countries  Bond spreads Consistent with 
(limited) moral 
hazard  
Noy (2004) 
(creditor) 
1/1994-
12/2000, 
monthly  
EMBI plus (15 
countries)  
Bond spreads  No evidence of 
moral hazard  
Corsetti et al. 
(2006) (debtor) 
 Brazil and 
Argentina 
Macroeconomic 
Policy 
Consistent with 
moral hazard 
* The result is based on the authors’ own judgment. 
 
